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This Article calls into question stereotypical assumptions about the presumed 
lack of state intervention in the family and the patriarchal violence of Anglo-
American frontier societies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By 
analyzing previously unexamined cases of domestic assault and homicide in the 
American West and Australia, Professor Ramsey reveals a sustained (but largely 
ineffectual) effort to civilize men by punishing violence against women. Husbands 
in both the American West and Australia were routinely arrested or summoned to 
court for beating their wives in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Judges, police 
officers, journalists, and others expressed dismay over domestic assaults. However, 
legal authorities struggled with the dilemma of how to deter batterers whose 
victims were reluctant to prosecute. To be sure, the state’s response was not as 
aggressive as under modern mandatory arrest laws and no-drop prosecution 
policies. Yet the “why didn’t she leave?” question actually may have seemed easier 
to answer in the late 1800s and early 1900s than it did later in the twentieth 
century. Due to the failure of the state to prevent recidivist domestic violence, 
juries and even judges often deemed the actions of women who killed their abusive 
husbands wholly or partially justified. In contrast, husbands who killed their wives 
tended to be convicted of murder because their crimes violated the ideal of the 
“respectable family man” that was vital to the efforts of both the American West 
and Australia to project a civilized image. 
This Article makes three contributions. First, it presents a complex and 
surprising picture of gender relations in the American West and Australia by 
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showing that men punished other men for physically attacking their wives and that 
there was greater public concern about violent marriages than scholars have 
realized. Second, it documents the criminal prosecution of wife beaters and wife 
killers on two continents during a seventy-year period, which indicates that this 
was not just an isolated peak of intervention in a long history of apathy toward 
domestic violence. Third, Professor Ramsey shows that scholarly emphasis on 
women’s insanity claims has obscured the extent to which female defendants 
successfully raised self-defense arguments to obtain acquittal or mitigation in 
intimate-partner murder cases. The justification of abused women’s use of deadly 
force acknowledged the desperate circumstances they faced in societies that 
condemned domestic violence, but had neither succeeded in deterring it, nor 
provided victims with adequate escape routes. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, both the American West and 
Australia were frontier regions seized from indigenous populations and settled by 
waves of immigrants, some of whom came to strike it rich in the goldfields.1 Both 
conjure images of stereotypically masculine men—the miner, the Indian fighter, the 
cowboy, the sheep-shearer—whose characters were forged in a hostile wilderness. 
According to the classic account, the frontier produced rugged American 
individualism in a landscape where women were subordinated and practically 
invisible.2 Frederick Jackson Turner’s famous Frontier Thesis “used ruggedness as 
a euphemism for exceptional capacity for force and violence”3 and assumed the 
“individual” was male.4 In Australia, “[m]ateship” is thought to have emerged from 
the brutal convict era as an exclusively male form of camaraderie that reinforced 
patriarchy and perpetuated the sexual objectification of women.5 The American 
frontiersman and the hard-drinking “Lone Hand” of the Australian bush, who 
lacked family duties but not sex, became cultural heroes while most men in both 
places settled into married life.6 If such images of hypermasculinity are taken at 
face value, however, they lead to a stock narrative of social acceptance and even 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See John Braithwaite, Crime in a Convict Republic, 64 MOD. L. REV. 11, 16–17 
(2001). 
 2. See Joan M. Jensen & Darlis A. Miller, The Gentle Tamers Revisited: New 
Approaches to the History of Women in the American West, in WOMEN AND GENDER IN THE 
AMERICAN WEST 9, 10–11 (Mary Ann Irwin & James F. Brooks eds., 2004) (describing the 
insignificance of women in Frederick Jackson Turner’s Frontier Thesis). 
 3. JOHN PETTEGREW, BRUTES IN SUITS: MALE SENSIBILITY IN AMERICA, 1890–1920, at 
39 (2007).  
 4. See id. at 23. 
 5. See Braithwaite, supra note 1, at 42. 
 6. Marilyn Lake, The Politics of Respectability: Identifying the Masculinist Context, 22 
HIST. STUD. 116, 120–21 (1986); see Dee Garceau, Nomads, Bunkies, Crossdressers, and 
Family Men: Cowboy Identity and the Gendering of Ranch Work, in ACROSS THE GREAT 
DIVIDE: CULTURES OF MANHOOD IN THE AMERICAN WEST 149, 152, 165 (Matthew Basso, 
Laura McCall & Dee Garceau eds., 2001) (noting that cowboys attained hero status as more 
men became land-owning ranchers with wives and families). 
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approval of violence against women that is not supported by historical evidence. 
This Article’s analysis of intimate-partner assault and homicide cases reveals that 
the reality in the American West and Australia was much more complicated. The 
research presented here does not challenge empirical findings about high rates of 
domestic violence in frontier societies.7 Instead, it sheds new light on the role of 
police, courts, juries, and the press in condemning such violence and demonstrates 
that, even on the frontier, the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century home was less 
private than leading scholars assume.8 
Western American states and territories wanted to attract female settlers, curb 
drinking and other vices, and make a bid for civility; hence, temperance campaigns 
were paired not only with woman suffrage and the expansion of legal opportunities 
for divorce, but also with the criminal prosecution of wife beating and wife murder. 
For somewhat similar reasons, Australian men also punished other men for 
engaging in domestic violence. As Australians sought to shed their convict past, 
their desire to display respectability through protectiveness toward women led to 
denunciation of intimate-partner assaults and homicides perpetrated by men, 
though the criminal sentences actually imposed were often less severe in Australia 
than in the American West. The demise of the right to inflict corporal punishment 
on one’s wife was increasingly associated with the values of a rising elite. Because 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. See, e.g., RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE 275 (2009) (“The Southwest had 
by far the worst rates of marital homicide in the second half of the nineteenth century.”). 
Roth states, however, that “family and intimate homicide rates remained low relative to the 
rates for unrelated adults” throughout the nineteenth century, though they began to increase 
in the late 1820s and 1830s. Id. at 250. 
 8. It is an often-repeated orthodoxy among scholars of domestic violence that, 
historically, society and the state accepted and even encouraged wife beating and other forms 
of intimate-partner abuse. See ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF 
SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 5–6 
(1987) (stating that “lack of concern about the issue [of family violence] has been the normal 
state of affairs” in American history); ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, CHERYL HANNA, JUDITH G. 
GREENBERG & CLARE DALTON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
13 (2d ed. 2008) (“When women were viewed as inferior to men, needing to be instructed by 
men, what we now call domestic violence was simply seen as an appropriate part of that 
instruction.”); id. at 274 (“Historically, the criminal justice system has been characterized by 
its chronic inattention to domestic violence.”); Reva Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife 
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119–20 (1996) (contending that, 
after the Civil War, judges asserted that the criminal justice system should respect the 
privacy of middle- and upper-class families by not prosecuting wife beaters); see also, e.g., 
JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW 13 (2009) (“For much of our history, DV [domestic 
violence] was generally outside the reach of the criminal law. . . . Although wife beating was 
formally illegal in all U.S. states by 1920, it was not until the 1970s that efforts by the 
women’s movement to recast DV as a public concern began to succeed.”); Melissa Murray, 
Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate 
Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1269 (2009) (“Historically, spousal violence was exempted 
from state intervention and criminal prosecution.”); Emily Sack, Battered Women and the 
State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 
1666 (“For all of our history, until approximately twenty-five years ago, the criminal justice 
system did not recognize domestic violence as an issue of concern, much less focus on 
methods to attack it.”).  
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some Australian males, especially in the working class, continued to resist 
companionate marriage as an undesirable British import, the ideal of the 
“respectable family man” may not have gotten a firm foothold in Australia until the 
early twentieth century.9 But even in the 1800s, criminal cases reveal the 
beginnings of an effort to civilize Australia by policing violence against women.  
“Statehood” and “nationhood” are used in this Article to refer to the creation of 
a respectable society according to late Victorian cultural standards. These terms do 
not literally refer to the moment that California or any other western region became 
a state or the moment Australia became a nation. Rather, the aspiration toward 
civility continued long after the granting of these official designations. By the 
1920s, of course, Los Angeles had become the locus of the glamorous new film 
industry,10 and in Australia, suburbs had sprouted around the urban centers of 
Sydney and Melbourne.11 But for much of the period covered by this Article, both 
the American West and Australia struggled to establish a refined identity, which led 
to intolerance for domestic violence against women. 
This Article unfolds in two Parts. Part I analyzes the legal treatment and public 
views of men’s physical attacks on women in the American West and Australia in 
the second half of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth. 
The analysis presented here is not quantitative; it is virtually impossible to know 
how many women were beaten or killed, or even how many men were prosecuted, 
as only sparse records survive. Rather, this Article relies on extant criminal case 
files, sentencing records, and newspaper accounts of murder trials, as well as on 
routine press coverage of police and local court proceedings involving domestic 
assault and battery. Hence, it offers a rich (though admittedly incomplete) picture 
of public responses to men’s violence against female intimates. After providing 
social and demographic background, it explores nonfatal domestic assaults and 
attempted murder cases in an effort to understand the state’s failure to prevent 
recidivist batterers from murdering their spouses. Although the policies of courts 
and the police were ineffective, these policies nonetheless show a greater degree of 
state intervention and denunciation of battering than most scholars have 
recognized. Moreover, substantial continuity in the treatment of such cases past 
1900 suggests that historians have placed too much emphasis on the supposed 
decriminalization of domestic violence during the Progressive Era.12  
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. See Lake, supra note 6, at 130. 
 10. See, e.g., ROBERT SKLAR, FILM: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF THE MEDIUM 98 
(1993) (“By 1920 probably a majority of United States feature films were produced in 
Hollywood [or environs] . . . .”).  
 11. See, e.g., Seamus O’Hanlon, Cities, Suburbs and Communities, in AUSTRALIA’S 
HISTORY: THEMES AND DEBATES 172, 180–81 (Martyn Lyons & Penny Russell eds., 2005) 
(suggesting that suburban living was already becoming a “mark of social respectability” for 
Australians by the 1880s and that, in the post-war twentieth century, “the detached home in 
the suburbs became the symbol of Australian achievement” (emphasis in original)). 
 12. See LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF 
FAMILY VIOLENCE, BOSTON 1880–1960, at 21–22 (1988) (arguing that the Progressives 
tended to minimize and ignore domestic violence in the years 1910–1930 due to their zeal to 
keep families together); PLECK, supra note 8, at 125–26, 137 (suggesting that, in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century, family courts sought to decriminalize marital violence); 
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Part I then turns to homicide cases. Male defendants charged with killing their 
wives were typically convicted of murder and given prison sentences or even the 
death penalty in the American West and Australia. The somewhat more lenient 
outcomes for wife killers in Australia, compared to the American West, suggest 
that Australian society placed a higher value on female obedience and sobriety and, 
above all, the exclusion of women from the masculine sphere. Marilyn Lake 
cautions, “[t]o cast the struggle [for an Australian national culture] in terms of 
respectability and unrespectability is to miss the sexual dynamic in history.”13 Yet, 
by the same token, an overly reductive narrative of gender warfare ignores men’s 
reproof of other men for abusing their marital authority. What is needed is a revised 
legal history of domestic violence that explores how an unstable synthesis of 
paternalism, Victorian respectability, and early feminist concerns, including 
temperance, shaped public attitudes toward spousal assaults and homicides. In the 
American West and Australia during the late 1800s and early 1900s, emerging 
cultural forces denounced forms of male violence that may previously have been 
ritualized and accepted. Hence, wife beaters were fined, censured, or jailed, and 
wife killers usually received substantial prison terms or even capital punishment.  
By contrast, social change lent women’s resort to self-defensive killing 
heightened credibility. Part II shows that women accused of murder in the 
American West and Australia successfully deployed theories of justifiable 
homicide. Depending on the case, they could obtain acquittals or mitigation, not 
only by raising insanity claims, but also by convincing juries that their lethal acts 
were rational, justifiable responses to abuse. Although Australian women seem to 
have been convicted more often than their American counterparts, especially if the 
decedent did not pose an immediate threat, they were often acquitted on self-
defense grounds when they killed during a struggle. Legal historians have paid 
relatively little attention to the justification of killings by women. As Part II 
suggests, undue emphasis on insanity claims has obscured the extent to which 
female defendants obtained acquittals or mitigation for self-defensive acts against 
violent men deemed to have transgressed the duty to honor and protect their wives. 
I. POLICING MALE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
Women in the nineteenth-century American West and their counterparts in the 
Australian colonies of Victoria and New South Wales14 occupied an ambivalent 
                                                                                                                 
Siegel, supra note 8, at 2170 (contending that, by the 1920s, “[b]attered wives were 
discouraged from filing criminal charges against their husbands, urged to accept 
responsibility for their role in provoking the violence, and encouraged to remain in the 
relationship and rebuild it rather than attempt to separate or divorce”). 
 13. Lake, supra note 6, at 116. 
 14. This Article focuses on two colonies on Australia’s east coast that became the 
modern states of New South Wales and Victoria. I chose them, not only for their abundant 
historical records, but also because they have differing histories, which I initially thought 
might have produced contrasting approaches to intimate-partner violence. New South Wales 
began as a British penal colony to which convicted prisoners were transported, starting in the 
late eighteenth century. G.D. WOODS, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN NEW SOUTH WALES: 
THE COLONIAL PERIOD, 1788–1900, at 21 (2002). By contrast, the discovery of gold in the 
1850s drove the influx of settlers to Victoria. See ROBERT HUGHES, THE FATAL SHORE 563 
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position. On one hand, their presence had been actively sought from the mid-1800s 
to remedy a gender imbalance and to import respectability. On the other hand, the 
prescriptive ideal of the frontier woman as “tamer” or “civilizer” existed in tension 
with residual views of females as sexual commodities. The respectable wife was 
sometimes resented and satirized as prudish and nagging, and especially in 
Australia, the cultural resilience of the Lone Hand as a masculine hero perpetuated 
the view that “[a] wife and children will put the hobbles on you.”15 Generally 
speaking, however, companionate marriage based on the separate but reciprocal 
obligations of both spouses began to be established as the dominant social 
aspiration on America’s western frontier and in Australia during the second half of 
the nineteenth century.16 A husband was obliged to support his wife—to provide 
her with food, clothing, and shelter and, while the cultural expectation of wifely 
obedience proved resilient, “nothing . . . required a wife to submit to cruelty or to 
tyranny.”17 It was against this standard that men’s violence toward their female 
intimates was judged.  
Part I tracks the arrival of the respectable family ideal in the American West and 
Australia. Then, using previously unexamined primary sources, it demonstrates that 
the criminal justice system generally reacted with disapproval, rather than empathy 
or apathy, toward wife beaters and wife killers. 
A. Social and Demographic Background  
Women’s social status derived from the changing needs they fulfilled. In the 
early days, men vastly outnumbered women in the American mining camps and the 
Australian penal colonies, which exacerbated the subordination of women as 
objects of sexual gratification. During the first decades of penal transportation, 
unmarried female immigrants to Australia were often propositioned for sex upon 
                                                                                                                 
(1987). Despite their disparate origins, however, New South Wales and Victoria treated 
domestic homicides in remarkably similar ways. See, e.g., infra note 296 and accompanying 
text. 
 15. Lake, supra note 6, at 118 (quoting RANDOLPH BEDFORD, NOUGHT TO THIRTY-
THREE 73 (1976)); see JUDITH A. ALLEN, SEX AND SECRETS: CRIMES INVOLVING AUSTRALIAN 
WOMEN SINCE 1880, at 5 (1990) [hereinafter ALLEN, SEX AND SECRETS] (commenting on the 
disparagement of the “wowser” wife); BRIAN ROBERTS, AMERICAN ALCHEMY: THE 
CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH AND MIDDLE-CLASS CULTURE 231, 247 (2000) (describing 
resentment toward prudish female reformers who sought to civilize the West); see also 
ROTH, supra note 7, at 278 (stating that many male settlers in California “spoke 
disparagingly about getting tied down to women”). Even the church—an institution 
responsible for emphasizing the benefits of married life—sought to attract Australian men by 
offering its own male organizations and recreations as an escape from domesticity. Anne 
O’Brien, “A Church Full of Men”: Masculinism and the Church in Australian History, 100 
AUSTL. HIST. STUD. 437, 449–54 (1993). 
 16. ROBERT GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA, 1850–1890: VICTORIAN 
ILLUSIONS AND EVERYDAY REALITIES 5 (1982); cf. ANNE SUMMERS, DAMNED WHORES AND 
GOD’S POLICE 359 (new ed. 1994) (noting that the stereotype of married, stay-at-home wives 
as “God’s police” exalted women’s moral power, but denied them economic independence 
and the power of self-determination). 
 17. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 156 (2000); see id. at 
154, 156–57. 
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arrival, whether they were convicts or free persons, and the colony’s governors 
deemed them prostitutes if they cohabited with men.18 The label of “whore” was 
also associated with the early female settlers of America’s western frontier, despite 
the fact that many women came west as homesteaders or domestic servants and did 
not engage in sex work.19 Indeed, the caricature of the American frontier woman as 
brothel madam lingered to compete with more wholesome images of the female 
helpmate and civilizer.20 
The demographic situation changed in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Although men outnumbered women by twenty-three to one in California in 1860, 
the imbalance was only two to one a decade later.21 Colorado and Oregon 
experienced a similarly dramatic influx of females, whereas skewed gender ratios 
persisted in Arizona, Nevada, Wyoming, Idaho, and Montana.22 By 1900, parity 
had nearly been achieved in some western cities; for example, Denver and Los 
Angeles had more than ninety-five women for every one hundred men.23 The 
numbers of men and women in the Australian colonies of New South Wales and 
Victoria gradually equalized over the course of the nineteenth century, too, so that 
by the 1880s, an increased number of men were able to marry.24 These changes 
arose in part from a conscious policy of civilizing the frontier by encouraging the 
migration of respectable women. 
1. Settling the American West 
For American miners and adventurers, many of whom came from the middle 
class, the way west initially offered an exciting escape from the constraints of 
bourgeois domesticity.25 But some of these men began to long for a restoration of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. See SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 313–16; see also ALLEN, SEX AND SECRETS, supra 
note 15, at 4–5; PAULA J. BYRNE, CRIMINAL LAW AND COLONIAL SUBJECT: NEW SOUTH 
WALES, 1810–1830, at 39, 50, 287 (1993). Despite popular myth, no female convicts were 
actually sent to Australia for engaging in prostitution, which was not a transportable offense. 
See HUGHES, supra note 14, at 244; Braithwaite, supra note 1, at 41. The official 
characterization of female immigrants as either “married” or “concubine” clashed with 
working-class tolerance for cohabitation out of wedlock. See HUGHES, supra note 14, at 247. 
 19. See Jensen & Miller, supra note 2, at 15; see also Ronald M. James & Kenneth H. 
Fliess, Women of the Mining West: Virginia City Revisited, in COMSTOCK WOMEN: THE 
MAKING OF A MINING COMMUNITY 17, 28–29 (Ronald M. James & C. Elizabeth Raymond 
eds., 1998) (stating that prostitutes did not make up a large portion of the women living and 
working in Virginia City, Nevada, but also that they were the most likely to lie to census-
takers about their occupations). But cf. PAULA PETRIK, NO STEP BACKWARD: WOMEN AND 
FAMILY ON THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINING FRONTIER, HELENA, MONTANA, 1865–1900, at 
25–58 (1987) [hereinafter PETRIK, NO STEP BACKWARD] (discussing prostitution as a source 
of entrepreneurship and employment outside the home in late nineteenth-century Montana). 
 20. See Jensen & Miller, supra note 2, at 11–14. 
 21. Id. at 19. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Id. at 19, 22. 
 24. See Lake, supra note 6, at 122. 
 25. See SUSAN LEE JOHNSON, ROARING CAMP: THE SOCIAL WORLD OF THE CALIFORNIA 
GOLD RUSH 156 (2000) (discussing white men who indulged in the Gold Rush pleasures of 
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the standards they had known on the East Coast.26 Social reformer and former 
prison matron Eliza Farnham tried to bring more than one hundred single women to 
Gold Rush California to become the wives of bachelor-prospectors.27 Though she 
failed in her specific mission and was widely ridiculed for her prudery, the view 
that attracting “pure” females to the West would “aid in the territory’s transition to 
statehood, and . . . lend a veneer of respectability to the region’s rising economy” 
eventually gained male adherents.28 Women’s Christian influence and 
presumptively greater moral purity was thought to make the home a refuge from 
the volatile, disorderly public life of the mining town. The scarcity of white females 
led to their idealization and to draconian efforts to protect them, as illustrated by 
the decree of capital punishment “for murder, thieving, or insulting a woman” in 
one Montana mining camp.29 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, western cities began to copy 
the tall buildings of East Coast urban centers like Manhattan, and museums, 
libraries, theatres, city parks, and churches began to replace the saloon as sites of 
community and recreation.30 Religious and charitable organizations proliferated.31 
Most importantly, nineteenth-century moralists extolled the virtues of home life.32 
As the companionate ideal took root, men were judged by their conformity to 
idealized dual roles: a secular version of the Protestant work ethic in the business 
sphere and the expectation that they would show kindness and affection to their 
wives at home.33  
2. The Rise of Respectable Australian Society 
The colonial government of New South Wales decided by the early 1800s that 
female convicts ought to become wives rather than concubines.34 The project in 
Australia was one of redemption: marriage promised to rehabilitate men and end 
criminal careers.35 After penal transportation to New South Wales ended in 1840, 
                                                                                                                 
“card playing, strong drink, easy sex, and even the license to cuss with impunity”); ROBERTS, 
supra note 15, at 263 (“Out there, middle-class men did not have to act middle-class; nor 
would they be crippled in doing business by a bourgeois standard of respectability.”). 
 26. See ROBERTS, supra note 15, at 255–56. 
 27. See id. at 230–33. 
 28. Id. at 255; see id. at 221–47 (discussing Farnham’s failed mission). 
 29. Jensen & Miller, supra note 2, at 12 (emphasis added) (discussing the origins of the 
image of the frontier woman as a civilizing agent). The phrase “insulting a woman” likely 
referred to rape or at least to unwanted sexual imposition.  
 30. See CARL ABBOTT, THE METROPOLITAN FRONTIER: CITIES IN THE AMERICAN WEST, at 
xviii (1993); THOMAS J. NOEL, THE CITY AND THE SALOON: DENVER, 1858–1916, at 113, 115 
(2d ed. 1996); see also Carolyn B. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control, 
1880–1920, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 101, 163–64 & nn.332, 336 (2006) [hereinafter Ramsey, 
Intimate Homicide] (describing such developments in Denver, Colorado). 
 31. See ABBOTT, supra note 30, at xviii. 
 32. See GRISWOLD, supra note 16, at 129–30.  
 33. Id. at 92. 
 34. See BYRNE, supra note 18, at 38, 41; Hilary Golder & Diane Kirkby, Marriage and 
Divorce Before the Family Law Act, 1975, in SEX, POWER, AND JUSTICE: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON LAW IN AUSTRALIA 152 (Diane Kirkby ed., 1995). 
 35. Braithwaite, supra note 1, at 42. 
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reformer Caroline Chisholm espoused the belief that women could assume the 
civilizing function that chaplains had performed during the convict era.36 Chisholm 
deemed the role of women as “moral police” more necessary in Australia than in 
England, where respectability was better entrenched among the middle classes: “In 
Australia, the embryo of respectable society existed but it was necessary to protect 
it, and allow it to expand and perpetuate.”37 To this end, Chisholm traveled to 
England in the 1840s to locate the wives and children of emancipated male 
convicts, as well as to recruit single women and entire families as settlers.38 The 
discovery of gold in New South Wales and Victoria in the 1850s initially led to an 
influx of single, male adventurers and a corresponding resurgence of prostitution, 
which threatened Chisholm’s project.39 However, the gold rush and the wool trade 
ultimately created the conditions for the rise of an Australian bourgeoisie.40 It was 
only then that Australians began to claim a respectable identity of their own, rather 
than looking to their British roots.41 
The exaltation of female purity, often associated with the Victorian era of the 
British Empire, was not entirely new to Australia at midcentury. Rather, popular 
celebration of the outlaw bushranger who challenged British authority had long 
contained a strand of protectiveness toward women. As folk histories recount, in 
the early 1820s, Matthew Brady led a notorious band of cattle-rustlers and sheep-
stealers in Tasmania, but “would never harm a woman or let any of his gang do 
so.”42 He beat and even killed associates who raped or murdered female settlers, 
and when he was finally hanged in 1826, “[w]omen shed tears for the ‘likely lad,’ 
‘the poor colonial boy,’ who had shown such consideration to their sex.”43 Several 
historians have documented the survival of a free-wheeling masculine ethos, 
resistant to Victorian social mores, at the end of the 1800s and even into the early 
1900s.44 Since Australian wealth derived from pastoral and mining interests,45 the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 347–48. 
 37. Id. at 348. 
 38. See id. This strategy was not unique to New South Wales. Indeed, Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield, the founder of South Australia, pursued a plan to found a colony based on equal 
numbers of men and women to ensure that “no woman there would be without a protector, 
and no man would have an excuse for dissolute habits.” Id. at 344 (quoting S. AUSTL. ASS’N, 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA: OUTLINE OF THE PLAN OF A PROPOSED COLONY 16 (London, Ridgway & 
Sons 1834)). 
 39. See id. at 350; Susanne Davies, Captives of Their Bodies: Women, Law, and 
Punishment, 1880s–1980s, in SEX, POWER, AND JUSTICE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LAW 
IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 34, at 99, 103. 
 40. See HUGHES, supra note 14, at 564, 571. 
 41. See SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 353. 
 42. HUGHES, supra note 14, at 232. 
 43. Id. at 234. The government in the penal colonies also dealt harshly with femicide. 
Indeed, a sample of murder cases in New South Wales from 1824 to 1840 indicates that the 
majority of men accused of killing their wives were convicted of murder. Carolyn B. 
Ramsey, Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on Feminist Homicide Law Reform, 100 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 33, 46–47 & app. (2010) [hereinafter Ramsey, Provoking 
Change]. 
 44. See, e.g., Lake, supra note 6, at 122; O’Brien, supra note 15, at 443. 
 45. See Carolyn Strange, Masculinities, Intimate Femicide, and the Death Penalty in 
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bushranger and the Lone Hand were not mythical characters—nor, according to the 
tale of Matthew Brady, were they uniformly misogynistic. Yet the majority of the 
population had concentrated in urban areas by 1900,46 and for most Australians, 
internalization of the ideal of civilized family life became the principal means of 
escaping the social stigma that divided Australia’s pseudo-gentry from former 
convicts and their children.  
3. Divorce, Political Rights, and Changing Expectations of Marriage 
By the second half of the nineteenth century—when this study of intimate-
partner violence begins—families and the prescriptive ideals governing them had 
begun to take root in both Australia and the American West. For Anglo men, the 
capacity to provide for one’s family and treat one’s wife as a “sacred partner” and 
guardian of morality supposedly divided respectable from unrespectable, white 
from nonwhite.47 However, expectations about marital relations were undergoing 
further change, which produced gendered cultural tensions. The prevalence of 
drunkenness and itinerant labor in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
Australian society exacerbated domestic strife and were widely blamed for wife 
beating and desertion.48 American women also rallied around the temperance 
movement in an effort to change misbehaving husbands.49 
                                                                                                                 
Australia, 1890–1920, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 310, 317 (2003). 
 46. See id. 
 47. Karen J. Leong, A Distinct and Antagonistic Race: Constructions of Chinese 
Manhood in the Exclusion Debates, 1869–78, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE, supra note 6, at 
131, 132–33 (quoting DAILY MORNING CALL (S.F., Cal.), Feb. 25, 1878); see Braithwaite, 
supra note 1, at 26–27 (discussing the importance of marriage to the social reintegration of 
convicts in Australia); see also GRISWOLD, supra note 16, at 93 (“[H]ow closely a man 
conformed to [a secularized version of the Protestant] work ethic helped predict how his 
friends and neighbors judged his worthiness as a husband.”); cf. Durwood Ball, Cool to the 
End: Public Hangings and Western Manhood, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE, supra note 6, 
at 97, 99–100 (indicating that manly self-restraint was reserved for whites because men of 
color were presumed to lack civility and to be innately inferior). 
 48. Indeed, according to Judith Allen: 
‘Ill-used’ wives of drinking men who saw little to be gained by other high-
minded feminist campaigns, and whose dependency made them unable to 
attack their men’s behaviour directly, found in temperance an indirect venue for 
articulation of their grievances. They could challenge husbandly behaviour 
under the most respectable aegis with the blessing of clergy and civil 
establishment. 
Judith Allen, ‘Mundane’ Men: Historians, Masculinity, and Masculinism, 22 HIST. STUD. 
617, 622 (1987) [hereinafter Allen, ‘Mundane’ Men]; see Lake, supra note 6, at 124.  
 49. See BARBARA LESLIE EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF DOMESTICITY: WOMEN, 
EVANGELISM, AND TEMPERANCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 102 (1981) (stating that 
temperance crusaders attributed wife beating and domestic strife to the abuse of alcohol); 
Anita Ernst Watson, Jean E. Ford & Linda White, “The Advantages of Ladies’ Society”: The 
Public Sphere of Women on the Comstock, in COMSTOCK WOMEN, supra note 19, at 179, 
192–94 (discussing the leading role of female temperance reformers in promoting the view 
that drinking had a detrimental effect on Nevada families). For a brief discussion of 
nineteenth-century concerns about idle, drunken husbands and the role of women in 
Colorado’s anti-liquor movement, see Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 30, at 149 & 
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Another area of social reform was the expanded ability to escape an 
unsatisfactory marriage. In the United States, new laws and broad judicial 
interpretations of existing statutes made fault-based divorce attainable. By 1857, 
appellate decisions in California had expanded divorce on grounds of cruelty to 
include “mental cruelty,” such as false accusations of adultery.50 In 1870, the 
legislature adopted this change statutorily—a move largely attributable to the rise 
of companionate marriage and married women’s elevated moral stature.51 Similar 
legal developments occurred in Nevada in the 1860s,52 Montana in the 1880s, and 
Wyoming in the 1890s.53 Although the ideal of companionate marriage may have 
originated with the bourgeoisie, more than half of the divorce petitioners who 
asserted violations by misbehaving spouses in late nineteenth-century California 
came from the skilled and unskilled laboring classes.54 Australia’s divorce rate 
remained low compared to that in the United States because Australian laws “did 
not allow divorce on the single and ‘elastic’ ground of cruelty” until somewhat 
later.55 Yet, starting in the 1880s, a woman in New South Wales or Victoria could 
divorce her husband for physically assaulting her, as well as if he committed 
adultery, got sent to prison, or was habitually drunk and cruel.56 By 1892, courts in 
New South Wales considered cruelty alone a sufficient ground for divorce.57  
There was an acknowledged connection between wife beating and the necessity 
of making it easier for women to leave violent marriages. Indeed, in both Australia 
and the American West, the extension of divorce reflected increased recognition by 
legal authorities that abused women should have a better avenue for escape than the 
criminal courts. Australian judge Sir Alfred Stephen believed, for example, that 
“prosecution was no solution for women compelled to reside with and be supported 
by their assailants.”58  
The cultural emphasis on women’s moral purpose first “increased [their] status 
at home but [later] expanded the acceptable limits to women’s activity in 
society.”59 Campaigns for voting rights and equal employment opportunities, in 
addition to temperance and education reform, paralleled the extension of divorce. 
Significantly, many suffragists in the American West couched their arguments for 
the vote in the language of companionate marriage, arguing “that women should 
vote because their moral perspective and domestic responsibilities allied them with 
                                                                                                                 
n.248. 
 50. See GRISWOLD, supra note 16, at 19–20. 
 51. See id. at 20. 
 52. Kathryn Dunn Totten, “They Are Doing So to a Liberal Extent Here Now”: Women 
and Divorce on the Comstock, 1859–1880, in COMSTOCK WOMEN, supra note 19, at 74, 78–
79. 
 53. PETRIK, NO STEP BACKWARD, supra note 19, at 106–12; Paula Petrik, Send the Bird 
and Cage: The Development of Divorce Law in Wyoming, 1868–1900, 6 W. LEGAL HIST. 
153, 154–55, 169–70 (1993) (noting that the ideal of companionate marriage was slow to 
arrive in Wyoming). 
 54. GRISWOLD, supra note 16, at 25. 
 55. Golder & Kirkby, supra note 34, at 164. 
 56. Id. at 159. 
 57. ALLEN, SEX AND SECRETS, supra note 15, at 50. 
 58. Id. at 49. 
 59. GRISWOLD, supra note 16, at 15. 
196 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:185 
 
those anxious to ameliorate the problems of an increasingly complex world.”60 
Similarly, according to Australian feminists in the 1880s and 1890s, giving women 
the vote would spread the influence of women’s humane and civilizing qualities: 
“In advocating this, the feminists were restating Caroline Chisholm’s theory of 
women’s mission which had formed one of the fundamental bases of the Australian 
family.”61  
The frontier regions discussed in this Article granted women political rights 
comparatively early. By the end of the nineteenth century, women could vote in 
four western American states.62 California granted woman suffrage in 1911,63 and 
Arizona, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington followed suit by 
1914, six years prior to the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.64 The newly federated Commonwealth of Australia allowed all 
white women to vote by 1902.65  
The right and obligation of women to serve on juries might seem like a natural 
corollary of suffrage; yet, throughout the period covered by this Article, criminal 
trial juries remained predominantly, if not exclusively, male. The western United 
States pioneered female jury service, as it had voting rights, in an express attempt 
to counteract frontier violence and lawlessness.66 However, because there was a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. PETRIK, NO STEP BACKWARD, supra note 19, at 115 (quoting JULIE ROY JEFFREY, 
FRONTIER WOMEN: THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI WEST, 1840–1880, at 194 (1979)). 
 61. SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 408. 
 62. These states were Wyoming, Colorado, Idaho, and Utah. See Akhil Reed Amar, The 
Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 
913–14 (2001). 
 63. See In re Mana, 72 P. 986 (Cal. 1918) (“By an amendment of our Constitution, 
October 10, 1911 (art. II, § 1), women were given the right to vote and hold office.”). 
 64. Amar, supra note 62, at 913. 
 65. Prior to Federation, Western Australia and South Australia were the first colonies to 
take that step, granting woman suffrage in the late nineteenth century; New South Wales and 
Victoria gave females the right to vote in 1902 and 1908, respectively. See AUSTL. GOV’T, 
DEP’T OF FAMILIES, HOUS., CMTY. SERV. & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, WOMEN IN AUSTRALIAN 
SOCIETY—MILESTONES—1871–1983, available at http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/ 
sa/women/progserv/research/Pages/wia_milestones_1871_1983.aspx [hereinafter WOMEN IN 
AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY]. 
 66. See Joanna L. Grossman, Women’s Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of 
Difference?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1135–36 (1994). At least five frontier states allowed 
mixed juries by 1920, with Utah leading the way in 1898. See Grace Elizabeth Woodall 
Taylor, Jury Service for Women, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 224, 225–26 (1959) (describing the 
advent of women on juries in California, Kansas, Utah, Washington, and Nevada). Although 
the Wyoming Territory seated its first female jurors in 1870, it made clear that such service 
was a revocable privilege, not a right. Indeed, women were subsequently barred from jury 
service there until 1950. Debora A. Person, Wyoming Pre-Statehood Legal Materials: An 
Annotated Bibliography—Part II, 7 WYO. L. REV. 333, 385–86 (2007); Taylor, supra, at 
225–26. Women were not officially eligible to serve in Colorado until 1945, even if they 
occasionally helped fill the jury box in criminal cases prior to that date. See Ramsey, 
Intimate Homicide, supra note 30, at 103 n.8; cf. Robert W. Pepin & Laura E. Flenniken, 
The Colorado Criminal Juror: A Tribute, 26 COLO. LAW., June 1997, at 127, 127 (stating 
that, in 1897, an African American woman was the first woman to sit as a juror in a criminal 
case in Colorado). 
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shortage of women in the venire even after females gained eligibility to serve, the 
values expressed and enforced by jury verdicts in intimate-partner violence cases 
were largely those of men.67 A similar situation existed in Australia, where gender 
equality with regard to jury service was not achieved until the mid-1970s.68  
4. Intimate-Partner Violence and Domesticated Manhood 
With its double-edged implications for women, the ideal of the wife as a 
civilizing influence on men and society nevertheless shaped legal responses to 
intimate-partner violence during the period discussed in this Article. It was this 
ideal—and not the older right of husbands to inflict corporal punishment on 
disobedient wives69—that led courts and juries to condemn men for killing female 
intimates and to acquit women of murder.  
Domesticity and respectability were not hegemonic norms. Some men staunchly 
resisted them. A strong counter-current in Australian society continued to claim the 
itinerant, beer-swilling Lone Hand as the national image at the time of Federation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. American courts continued to uphold automatic exemptions and opt-out provisions 
for women in the second half of the twentieth century. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 
(1961) (upholding the constitutionality of a state law automatically relieving women from 
jury service unless they voluntarily registered). In Hoyt, a Florida woman whom an all-male 
jury convicted of murdering her husband unsuccessfully challenged the automatic exclusion 
of females from the venire unless they voluntarily registered. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 62. Few 
women opted to serve in western states either. See, e.g., People v. Turner, 269 P. 204, 205 
(Cal. 1928) (noting that a California judge addressed his erroneous instructions to “lady and 
gentlemen of the jury” in a trial resulting in the manslaughter conviction of a young Indian 
woman (emphasis added)). However, the predominance of men on criminal juries did not 
inevitably lead to compassion for male defendants and severity for females—in fact, more 
often, it led to the reverse. See infra Part II.A., Part II.B, notes 363–72 and accompanying 
text, Part II.D.1, Part II.D.2. 
 68. WOMEN IN AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY, supra note 65; see Michael Chesterman, Criminal 
Trial Juries in Australia from Penal Colony to Federal Democracy, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 69, 80 (1999). 
 69. See HARTOG, supra note 17, at 151 (suggesting that, by the mid-nineteenth century, 
“[t]he law seemed to offer few real means for men to secure the obedience of their wives” 
and that even moderate chastisement of one’s wife was thought to preclude marital felicity); 
see also MARTIN J. WIENER, MEN OF BLOOD: VIOLENCE, MANLINESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 151–62 (2004); id. at 161 (arguing that, by the mid-1800s, “[k]indly 
treatment of one’s wife . . . became an important qualification for full citizenship” in 
Britain); cf. Siegel, supra note 8, at 2129–30 (acknowledging the formal abrogation of the 
common-law right of chastisement in legal treatises and judicial opinions by the 1870s). 
Although some men maintained that a right of chastisement continued to exist in nineteenth-
century Australia, see infra note 271 and accompanying text, a well-known treatise omitted 
wife beating from the examples of domestic correction that did not constitute criminal 
battery. See JOHN HUBERT PLUNKETT & WILLIAM HATTAM WILKINSON, PLUNKETT’S 
AUSTRALIAN MAGISTRATE 23 (1860) [hereinafter PLUNKETT & WILKINSON (1860)]. Even 
during Australia’s convict era, the government generally did not impose corporal punishment 
on females; “the moral decision to imprison women rather than physically beat them was 
made,” which contrasted dramatically with the frequent use of the lash on men. BYRNE, 
supra note 18, at 278.  
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in 1901.70 The American pattern might be better characterized as “devolution” from 
domestic ideals. At the end of the nineteenth century, robust physicality, ambition, 
and sexual drive began to replace Victorian self-restraint as the prevalent masculine 
standard in the United States, though this shift was delayed on the western frontier 
due to the late settlement of families there.71 In any case, men’s frustration with 
their failure to live up to prescriptive ideals of respectability, sobriety, and 
socioeconomic success contributed to marital and other intimate-partner 
homicides.72 As women increasingly vied for economic and political independence, 
the incidence of domestic violence actually may have increased in the American 
West and Australia.73  
However, during the late nineteenth century and the first few decades of the 
twentieth, the public legal response to intimate-partner assaults and homicides in 
both regions embodied the view that husbands ought to protect their wives and 
refrain from using violence against them. When men failed to live up to these 
prescriptive norms, state-imposed punishment and even self-defensive killings were 
considered justified. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. See Lake, supra note 6, at 118–21 (discussing masculinist Australian literary culture 
around the turn of the century); id. at 130 (“Masculinity was defined in terms of responsible 
breadwinning [by the 1920s].”). 
 71. See Ball, supra note 47, at 99; Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 30, at 124–
25, 148 (noting the emergence of a new masculine ideal around the turn of the century); id. 
at 160, 163 (discussing companionate marriage’s late arrival to the American West). David 
Peterson del Mar points out that there was a difference between the new, violent male 
literary hero and the actual behavior of American men, though he also contends that 
intimate-partner violence against women began to increase in the 1920s. See DAVID 
PETERSON DEL MAR, BEATEN DOWN: A HISTORY OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE IN THE WEST 
134 (2002) [hereinafter PETERSON DEL MAR, BEATEN DOWN]. 
 72. See Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 30, at 175; see also ROTH, supra note 7, 
at 259. 
 73. See PETERSON DEL MAR, BEATEN DOWN, supra note 71, at 123–30 (arguing that 
violence against wives increased as they became more independent, refused to be deferential, 
fought back, or sought a divorce); ROTH, supra note 7, at 11 (“In the nineteenth century 
long-term changes in relations between women and men produced an increase in marital and 
romance homicides that has persisted to this day.”); see also Jeffrey S. Adler, “My Mother-
in-Law Is to Blame, but I’ll Walk on Her Neck Yet”: Homicide in Late Nineteenth-Century 
Chicago, 31 J. SOC. HIST. 253, 258 (2001) (stating that domestic homicide rates skyrocketed 
at the end of the nineteenth century). Judith Allen suggests that, as the “new” Australian 
woman of the early twentieth century exercised her increased ability to divorce and support 
herself through employment, “estrangement was becoming a prediction for husbands slaying 
their wives, and against women slaying [their] husbands.” ALLEN, SEX AND SECRETS, supra 
note 15, at 127. Of course, as the numbers of men and women reached parity in Australia 
and the American West, there may simply have been more opportunities to engage in 
domestic violence. 
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B. The Response of Police and Courts to Nonfatal Domestic Violence 
The historical unwillingness of police and courts to interfere in intimate-partner 
violence has been overstated.74 Homicides occurred in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, as they do today, in part because state efforts to discourage 
beatings and to prevent the escalation of violence proved ineffectual. However, my 
research shows that police officers in the American West and Australia arrested 
abusive spouses, with and without the victim’s complaint, and that victims could 
also initiate criminal cases by applying to the magistrate for a summons.75 Most 
importantly, contrary to accepted feminist narratives about the privacy doctrine’s 
tacit endorsement of wife beating,76 both legal authorities and the press condemned 
domestic violence. 
To summarize my research findings presented in Part I.B: Defendants were 
brought to police court on charges of assaulting, battering, or attempting to murder 
their female intimates in numbers about equal to those for assaults involving 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. See GORDON, supra note 12, at 280–81 (suggesting that the police were not helpful 
when responding to domestic violence calls because they identified with the husband’s 
interest); PLECK, supra note 8, at 142 (noting “the police courts’ dismissal of the seriousness 
of family violence”); Lake, supra note 6, at 124 (“[P]olice [in colonial Australia] were 
reluctant to prosecute, [and] judges and magistrates frequently condoned a man’s violence 
towards his wife on the grounds that the woman had not fulfilled her wifely obligations or 
adopted a properly submissive demeanour.”); see also, e.g., Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice 
System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 212 (2008) (“Consistent with the general conception of 
domestic violence as a private matter, for many years the police refused to intervene in 
intimate partner abuse as they would in response to other crimes.”); Linda G. Mills, Intuition 
and Insight: A New Job Description for the Battered Woman’s Prosecutor and Other More 
Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 183, 190 n.33 (1997) (“History tells us that 
without mandatory arrest and prosecution, the police, and even prosecutors, are reluctant to 
take domestic violence seriously.”). Admittedly, however, many modern legal scholars, 
criminologists, and battered women’s advocates have focused on the refusal of police to 
respond to domestic violence calls in the second half of the twentieth century. See, e.g., Joan 
Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 46, 47–49 (1992) (discussing nonarrest policies in the 1970s). In contrast, this 
Article only considers the role of the police from 1860 to 1930. Hence, I do not debate, and, 
indeed, I think it quite plausible, that police officers became less willing to assist abused 
women later in the twentieth century.  
 75. To unearth the state’s treatment of nonfatal spousal assault cases in the American 
West, this Article primarily relies on statutory materials and articles from two California 
newspapers, the Los Angeles Times and San Francisco’s Daily Evening Bulletin, which 
collectively cover 1860 to 1930. The Gale database, 19th Century U.S. Newspapers, was 
also searched for articles on wife beating in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Oregon, and Utah. For journalistic views of intimate-partner violence, as well as 
factual information about assault cases in Australia, this Article uses Melbourne’s Argus and 
the Sydney Morning Herald, which were highly regarded for their law reporting. See ALEX 
C. CASTLES, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PRINTED MATERIALS ON AUSTRALIAN LAW 1788–
1900, at xx (1994) (confirming these newspapers’ reputation). Copies of all cited newspaper 
reports are on file with the author. 
 76. See supra notes 8, 12, 74 and accompanying text. 
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strangers and other types of relationships.77 Common and aggravated assaults came 
under the summary jurisdiction of Australian magistrates, whereas attempted 
murder and other attacks involving malice had to be tried before a jury.78 A 
common assault conviction carried the potential for a fine or several months in 
jail.79 By contrast, the law required several years imprisonment or service on a road 
gang for felony convictions,80 and in such cases, the judge might also allow the 
victim to separate from her abusive husband, make provisions for the legal custody 
of the children, and order the husband to pay his wife weekly or monthly 
maintenance after the expiration of his prison sentence.81 In summary cases, by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. According to Australian historian Judith Allen, for example, “Sampling police 
charge and summons books from Newtown Bench in the 1890s suggested that approximately 
half of assaults listed [in this Sydney suburb] concerned cohabiting couples.” Judith Allen, 
Policing Since 1880: Some Questions of Sex, in POLICING IN AUSTRALIA: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 208 (Mark Finnane ed., 1987) [hereinafter Allen, Policing Since 1880]. 
 78. See PLUNKETT & WILKINSON (1860), supra note 69, at 24 (citing 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, § 
27) (discussing common and aggravated assaults under summary jurisdiction); id. at 25–26 
(citing 1 Vict., c. 85, §§ 4–5 and 16 Vict., No. 17, § 4) (discussing indictable assaults). These 
distinctions continued in New South Wales through the early twentieth century. See 
WILLIAM HATTAM WILKINSON, FREDERICK BUSHBY WILKINSON & JOHN HUBERT PLUNKETT, 
THE AUSTRALIAN MAGISTRATE 34–36 (7th ed. 1903) [hereinafter WILKINSON ET AL. (1903)] 
(citing Crimes Act, No. 40, 1900, ss. 493–94) (discussing common and aggravated assaults 
under summary jurisdiction); id. at 186–89 (citing Crimes Act, No. 40, 1900, ss. 32–41) 
(discussing indictable assaults). The Colony of Victoria used prosecution by information, 
rather than indictment. See HENRY FIELD GURNER, THE PRACTICE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
THE COLONY OF VICTORIA 12 (1871). Assaults accompanied by attempt to commit a felony, 
such as murder, had to be committed for trial. See id. at 35. However, Victoria’s criminal 
code also allowed the summary adjudication of common assaults and aggravated assaults on 
women and children. It would be a mistake to associate summary adjudication solely with 
domestic violence cases, though. Rather, the Australian colonies relied heavily on paid 
magistrates to mete out justice summarily over a broad range of offenses, including juvenile 
misconduct. See ALEX C. CASTLES, AN AUSTRALIAN LEGAL HISTORY 373 (1982). 
 79. See PLUNKETT & WILKINSON (1860), supra note 69, at 24 (noting that the authorized 
penalty for common assault was a fine not exceeding £5 and, in default, imprisonment not 
exceeding two months). For examples of defendants receiving such sentences in Victoria in 
the 1860s, see Fitzroy, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), July 17, 1866, at 6 (reporting that James 
Beaton was to be fined five shillings or imprisoned for twenty-one days in default of 
payment for beating his wife); Miscellaneous Charges, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), June 30, 
1868, Supp., at 1 (“Edward DeGrouchy, charged with insulting behaviour and brutally 
assaulting his wife, was fined 5s.; in default of payment, forty-eight hours’ confinement.”); 
Wife-Beating and Assaulting a Constable, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Nov. 18, 1862, at 6 
(stating Patrick Kelly was ordered to pay a five-shilling fine, thirty shillings in damages, and 
a surety of £20 to keep the peace towards his wife for three months). The applicable prison 
term seems to have been increased to three months by the 1890s in New South Wales and 
probably in Victoria, as well. See WILLIAM HATTAM WILKINSON, FREDERICK BUSHBY 
WILKINSON & JOHN HUBERT PLUNKETT, THE AUSTRALIAN MAGISTRATE 38 (6th ed. 1894) 
[hereinafter WILKINSON ET AL. (1894)]. 
 80. See PLUNKETT & WILKINSON (1860), supra note 69, at 26. 
 81. See WILKINSON ET AL. (1894), supra note 79, at 166, 272; WILKINSON ET AL. (1903), 
supra note 78, at 195. 
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contrast, a fine or a bond to keep the peace for a specified amount of time might be 
imposed in lieu of incarceration.82 Summary adjudication with correspondingly less 
severe punishments was also common in the American West, as my analysis of 
nonlethal domestic violence cases in California will show. However, California 
wife beaters often spent a couple of months in jail, and they might be sentenced to 
several years in prison for using a deadly weapon.83 
Although both men and women appeared as defendants in intimate-partner 
assault cases,84 wife beaters overwhelmingly predominated in both regions, and the 
cases crossed class lines to implicate otherwise respectable families. Those 
punished for wife beating included wealthy men and members of the clergy,85 as 
well as the working class and the chronically unemployed.86 In contrast to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. PLUNKETT & WILKINSON (1860), supra note 69, at 24–25 (discussing the penalties 
for common and aggravated assaults under summary jurisdiction); WILKINSON ET AL. (1903), 
supra note 78, at 34, 36. 
 83. See infra notes 115, 118–23 and accompanying text.  
 84. See infra notes 135–38 and accompanying text (discussing cases of husband 
beating). For discussion of California courts’ flippant attitude toward husband-beating cases, 
see infra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Assaulting a Wife, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Sept. 21, 1866, at 7 (reporting 
that defendant Thomas G. Buckley “was a man respectably dressed”); Fried Potatoes as a 
Dressing for the Hair, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), July 6, 1875, at col. A (stating that 
a clergyman was fined $150, and would be sentenced to prison in default of payment, for 
throwing a plate at his wife and rubbing food in her hair); Lawyer Shaw Guilty of Wife-
Beating, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1901, at 10 (reporting that a lawyer was convicted of battery 
on his wife); Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Feb. 5, 1868, at 5 (stating that Australian 
defendant John Highfield was reputedly “a man of money”); Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, 
Austl.), Jan. 27, 1868, at 5 (noting that a man required to post a peace bond after he 
threatened to kill his wife was “a respectable well-to-do farmer, owning between one and 
two hundred acres of land”); Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Nov. 23, 1860, at 5 
(“From what was stated in court, it appeared the defendant [John Henderson] was possessed 
of considerable property . . . .”); see also People v. Griffith, 80 P. 68, 70 (Cal. 1905) (noting 
that the victim and her husband, who was convicted of assaulting her with a deadly weapon, 
were “people of wealth”); Continuance Won in Wife-Beating Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 
1927, at 17 (reporting that the president of a drilling company was to be tried for wife 
beating); Riverside County Affairs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1900, at 15 (“W.S. Gibbs a man of 
means and gentleman of leisure, was placed under arrest this morning . . . to answer to the 
charge of beating his wife.”); The Minor Courts: A Wealthy Farmer Charged with Wife-
Beating—Other Cases, MORNING OREGONIAN (Portland), Apr. 12, 1894, at 10 (reporting that 
a wealthy Oregon farmer charged with wife beating was released on bail pending grand jury 
proceedings). 
 86. For examples of working-class defendants, some of whom were racial minorities, 
see A Sailor Canes His Wife, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.) Dec. 7, 1882, col. F, at 3 
(reporting that sailor was sentenced to pay a fine of $50 for attacking his wife with a cane); 
Brute Escapes Easily, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1907, at II2 (reporting a sixty-day jail term for a 
“barber who committed a brutal assault on his wife”); For Wife Beating, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
22, 1905, at II7 (noting the arrest of a stonemason for wife beating); He Got Off Easy, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 2, 1900, at I10 (stating that a former fireman was sentenced to six months in 
county jail for assaulting his wife with a deadly weapon); Ocean Park, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 
1907, at II8 (noting that a “colored” chef pleaded guilty to battering his wife); Wife Beater 
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Australia, the outcomes of the American cases varied widely according to the sex 
of the offender. Whereas wife beaters were sternly censured and punished, the few 
husband beaters who appeared in court generally went free. Indeed, a man who 
“allowed” his wife to batter him presented an object of ridicule.87  
The severity of men’s attacks on female intimates ranged from those done with 
intent to kill and/or with deadly weapons, which were punished by imprisonment,88 
to incidents perceived to be minor, such as a husband “threatening to assault and 
beat his wife.”89 In cases that did not involve the use of a weapon or evidence of 
malice, courts often imposed noncustodial sentences, simply fining defendants or 
ordering them to post sureties to keep the peace for a specified number of months. 
Men were occasionally discharged on a mere promise to behave better or to abstain 
from liquor.90  
Recidivism was common, and some wife beaters subsequently appeared as 
murder defendants accused of killing their terrorized spouses.91 However, the 
failure of prevention was not the product of societal apathy in either the American 
West or Australia in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The press in both places 
described nonlethal assaults by husbands on wives in strong terms of blame and 
disapproval: “shameful,”92 “beastly,”93 “savage,”94 “a brutal outrage,”95 and “an 
                                                                                                                 
Jailed, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 1925, at G10 (indicating that a Hispanic dairyman, Frank 
Nunez, received a six-month jail sentence for wife beating). Unemployed men, many of 
them drunks, also appeared in court for wife beating. See, e.g., A Husband’s Threats, DAILY 
EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Feb. 22, 1890, at 3 (noting that a male defendant charged with 
threatening his wife’s life was also alleged to be “a shiftless man, unwilling to work”); 
Assault, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Feb. 6, 1862, at 6 (noting that the victim “was a hard 
working woman, and supported the prisoner by her labour”). 
 87. See infra notes 136–37 and accompanying text (discussing judges’ contempt for 
beaten husbands). 
 88. See infra note 123 (discussing the penalty for assault with a deadly weapon), notes 
147–52 and accompanying text (describing the Arnold case, which resulted in a conviction 
for assault with a deadly weapon), and Part I.B.2 (discussing cases of attempted murder or 
assault with intent to kill). 
 89. Proceedings in Police Court, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Nov. 9, 1869, at 
col. F.  
 90. See, e.g., Dismissed on His Promise, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Mar. 3, 
1869, at col. D (reporting that defendant’s wife “consented to a dismissal of the complaint” 
after defendant promised “never to strike his wife again” and “that he would take the pledge 
of abstinence from the use of intoxicating drinks”); Proceedings in Police Court, supra note 
89, at col. F (stating that defendant was “dismissed on his promise to treat her better for the 
future”). 
 91. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 92. Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), June 17, 1864, at 5 (discussing the case of 
James Tierney, in which “it seemed that . . . the prisoner had abused [his wife] in a shameful 
manner, and that he had been in the habit of doing so”). 
 93. A Wife Beater, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Nov. 28, 1883, col. A, at 
3. This article further stated that “[t]he sight of the burly wife-beater and his disfigured little 
wife was enough to make manhood indignant, whether he be an arm of the law or not.” Id. 
 94. Gerholdt Playing the Model Husband, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Oct. 16, 
1860, at col. D (noting the neighbors reported Gerholdt’s “savage assault made upon his own 
wife” to the police, but that Gerholdt fled).  
 95. The Warrenheip Outrage, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Feb. 27, 1860, at 5 
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inhuman assault upon a wife” by a “cruel husband and a debased drunkard.”96 
Although newspapers occasionally criticized courts for imposing insufficiently 
severe penalties,97 judges usually exercised their authority in ways that revealed 
their contempt for wife beaters.98 One Los Angeles judge opined, for example, that 
“wife-beating is one of the most contemptible of crimes,”99 and another declared 
that “wife-beating has no place in our civilization . . . and severe punishment 
should be meted out in such cases.”100  
As we shall see, however, there was no simple solution to the social problem of 
intimate-partner violence during the period covered by this Article. Effective 
deterrent measures proved elusive, as they do today. Dismissals and noncustodial 
sentences for misdemeanor domestic assaults constitute a point of continuity, not 
contrast, between the prevalent outcomes of such cases historically and those in the 
twenty-first-century United States.101 Then, as now, abused women sometimes 
impeded criminal prosecutions by recanting or refusing to testify. Many of them 
had no place to seek long-term shelter and no means of financial support, which left 
them vulnerable both to retaliatory violence and to the prospect that courts would 
                                                                                                                 
(recounting the “sickening story” of how a woman’s “fiend-like husband,” James Williams, 
had committed a “brutal outrage” upon her, inflicting head injuries and other wounds); see 
also The Eastern Border: Another Case of Brutal Wife Beating Reported, MORNING 
OREGONIAN (Portland), Mar. 24, 1891, col. A, at 12 (reporting that an Oregon man’s beating 
and abuse of his wife “in a most brutal manner” caused “widespread indignation among all 
the neighbors”). 
 96. The Courts: Police Court, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Apr. 29, 1874, at col. 
C; see also The Courts: Police Court, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), June 10, 1874, at 
col. C (reporting, on a different case, that a “sordid wretch convicted of making an 
outrageous assault upon his wife” was committed to county jail for defaulting on his fine). 
 97. See Frank Toal: The Brutal Wife-Carver and His Light Sentence, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
22, 1885, at 4 (“It is safe to say that nearly everyone in the court-room was surprised by the 
lightness of the sentence. From the almost unparalleled atrocity of Toal’s crime, and from 
the pertinent remarks thereon made by the judge himself, it was expected that the term would 
be at least ten years,” rather than the five years the defendant actually received for pleading 
guilty to assault with intent to murder.); see also Untitled, THE AGE (Melbourne, Austl.), 
Nov. 27, 1874, at 2 (“Assaults upon women, by adult males, are becoming far too common 
in our midst, and are visited in too many instances by punishments ridiculously inadequate to 
the gravity of the offence.”); Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), May 9, 1868, at 5 
(criticizing a police magistrate for imposing “a disgracefully inadequate penalty” on Joseph 
Fletcher for “assaulting his wife and turning her out of her house while in labour”). 
 98. See People v. Griffith, 80 P. 68, 73 (Cal. 1905) (describing a man’s shooting of his 
wife, leading to her partial blindness, as “brutal and unpardonable”); see also Postmaster to 
be Lashed, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1905, at I3 (reporting that an Oregon judge’s comments 
“preceding the sentence [of a wife beater] was a dramatic excoriation of the man”); infra 
notes 158–59, 161, 192, 223–24 and accompanying text (discussing judicial disapproval of 
wife beating). 
 99. Wife Beater Sentenced, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1914, at II7. 
 100. Court Orders Peace Bond on Plea of Wife, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1929, at A18. The 
judge in this case went on to express frustration that he could only require a peace bond from 
the batterer, as no criminal charges had been filed. Id. 
 101. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 8, at 342 (citing RICHARD R. PETERSON, 
COMBATING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN NEW YORK CITY: A STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
CASES IN CRIMINAL COURTS (2003)); SUK, supra note 8, at 35–38. 
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imprison their breadwinning husbands. Indeed, in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the emerging view that wife beating was wrongful and ought to 
be punished existed in tension with many female victims’ rejection of criminal law 
solutions.102 
1. Punishing Domestic Assault and Battery 
 
a. Peace Bonds and Imprisonment in Australia  
Although victim-initiated summons, obtained for a fee, were the most common 
means of haling abusive husbands into Australian courts,103 police officers initiated 
the arrest of violent men for attacking their wives in the late 1800s in two 
scenarios. First, an officer might act on a tip from neighbors or others. For instance, 
“William Davis was charged with a most brutal assault on his wife” after “the 
police on being informed of the case went to the house.”104 Davis, a drunk who had 
previously been ordered to post a bond to keep the peace, due to his repeated 
assaults on his wife, pleaded guilty to malicious wounding and was sentenced to 
three years in prison with hard labor.105 Second, and more rarely, a police officer 
might make his own independent investigation of an emergency that he discovered. 
The case of George Finlay, charged with being drunk and assaulting his wife in 
Victoria in 1860, provides an example of this latter category. George was arrested 
when the constable on duty came into his house to investigate a woman’s screams. 
The constable found Catherine Finlay covered with blood from being stabbed with 
a three-cornered file and intervened as George began choking her. He arrested 
George despite Catherine’s protestations and rescued him from “the anger of the 
crowd collected outside the house.”106 In court, Catherine “prayed for [George’s] 
discharge,” and he was released after being bound by his own recognizance of £25 
to keep the peace for six months.107  
Although the angry crowd and the constable’s independent investigation of the 
Finlay assault may have been atypical for Australia, other features of these cases 
represented the norm. For example, one of the arrests resulted in the defendant 
being released after he provided his own recognizance for a specified amount of 
money.108 Such an outcome resonates with those in my larger sample of eighty-four 
spouses charged with some type of nonfatal assault or wounding in Victoria in the 
1860s. I primarily culled information about the eighty-four criminal defendants, 
some of whom repeatedly appeared in court for domestic violence, from the police 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. See infra notes 160–65, 180–92 and accompanying text. 
 103. See ALLEN, SEX AND SECRETS, supra note 15, at 114. 
 104. Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Nov. 15, 1864, at 5. In another assault case, a 
doctor attending the pregnant victim got her violent husband placed in police custody. See 
Heartless Conduct, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), May 9, 1868, at 5 (reporting the facts of the 
Fletcher assault case). 
 105. Stabbing and Wounding, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Dec. 2, 1864, at Supp. 1. 
 106. Disorderly Conduct, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Mar. 9, 1860, at 7. 
 107. Wife-beating, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Mar. 13, 1860, at 5. 
 108. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (describing the outcome of the Finlay 
case). 
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and county court columns of Melbourne’s Argus newspaper. Journalists attended 
and reported on the routine business of such courts. These do not appear to be 
selective or sensationalistic accounts. Thirty-four of the eighty-four defendants 
escaped both a fine and jail time and were instead bound over to keep the peace for 
several months to one year. Either the defendant or those who posted sureties for 
him lost their money in the event of recidivism. If the defendant was convicted of a 
serious assault or was a repeat offender, the judge might sentence him to jail or 
prison for a term ranging from a week to several years.109 He also might be jailed if 
he could not post the requisite bond or if he defaulted on a fine.110 However, only 
twenty-two of the eighty-four Australian defendants in my sample received 
custodial sentences for intimate-partner violence during the period that I studied. 
Eight of them were ordered to pay a fine to the court or separate maintenance to 
their wives in lieu of incarceration. Eight cases were dismissed without any 
requirement of sureties or the defendant’s recognizance, and one defendant was 
acquitted. The outcomes of eleven cases were unclear from my sources. 
It is worth noting, however, that an Australian magistrate could not impose a 
prison term or a fine on the defendant in a common assault case if the victim 
declined to proceed; in such circumstances, justices could only require the accused 
to post a peace bond.111 Leniency toward wife beaters was thus shaped by victim 
                                                                                                                 
 
 109. See Assaulting a Wife, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Oct. 16, 1862, at 6 (describing 
how habitual wife beater Robert Jenkins received a sentence of ten months in prison for 
striking his wife in the head with an axe); The Warrenheip Outrage, supra note 95 (stating 
that James Williams, the perpetrator of “brutal and savage” assault on his spouse, was 
sentenced to two years in prison with hard labor); Williamstown, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), 
Apr. 30, 1866, at 6 (reporting that George Anderson, who was sentenced to fourteen days in 
jail for kicking his wife in the stomach, had previously endangered his wife’s life, even 
though they were still newlyweds); Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), July 2, 1868, at 5 
(stating that the bench required a man named Wilson, “who nearly killed his wife . . . by 
brutal ill-usage,” to serve a six-month prison sentence, in addition to posting a surety); 
Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Nov. 23, 1860, at 5 (reporting that John Henderson, 
who had been before the court “some 30 times,” was sentenced to two months in jail for 
violently assaulting his wife). 
 110. Brighton, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Sept. 8, 1866, at 6 (reporting that Joseph 
Mercer was imprisoned because he could not provide sureties or post bail); see also, e.g., 
Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Dec. 6, 1864, at 5 (similar report about defendant John 
Sunderland). 
 111. See PLUNKETT & WILKINSON (1860), supra note 69, at 24 (“[T]he Justices have no 
jurisdiction to convict in a penalty against the will of a complainant, where he prays only 
that the defendant may be bound over to keep the peace.” (citing R. v. Deny, L.J.M.C. 189)); 
see also WILKINSON ET AL. (1903), supra note 78, at 36 (same). In an 1868 case in which 
John Broadhurst appeared as a defendant, for example: “His wife complained that when he 
got drink he shamefully illused her, and she was not safe with him. Yet she did not wish to 
press the charge against him if he would promise to behave better in future; but the 
magistrates very properly made the order for surety.” Wife-Beating, ARGUS (Melbourne, 
Austl.), Dec. 15, 1868, at Supp. 1. Justices had more discretion in cases of aggravated 
assault on women and children because those cases could be initiated “either upon the 
complaint of the party aggrieved or otherwise.” PLUNKETT & WILKINSON (1860), supra note 
69, at 24.  
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preferences. Indeed, despite its failure to deter intimate-partner violence,112 the 
peace-bond approach revealed judicial awareness of the ongoing danger that abused 
women faced. Australian judges could only require sureties for threatening words 
or conduct that raised “a fear of some present or future danger, and not merely for a 
battery or trespass that is past.”113 Since so many peace bonds were required from 
batterers, courts must have acknowledged the recurrent nature of domestic abuse. 
Moreover, judicial commitment to imposing some kind of financial constraint on 
the defendant’s behavior despite the victim’s desire to drop the case shows an 
emerging view of domestic violence as a public problem, rather than an exclusively 
private matter. 
b. Fines and Jail Terms for Wife Beaters in the American West 
California courts took a more vigorous approach. Fines predominated over 
peace bonds and, in the 1870s, the penal code even gave judges discretion to punish 
a battery “committed upon the wife of the assailant” with “not less than twenty-one 
lashes on the bare back.”114 Although whipping was rarely, if ever imposed, wife 
beaters in California during the late 1800s and early 1900s had to pay substantial 
sums of money to avoid jail time, and some were incarcerated without being 
offered a fine as an alternative.115 Similar outcomes occurred in other western 
                                                                                                                 
 
 112. See infra Part II.B.4. 
 113. PLUNKETT & WILKINSON (1860), supra note 69, at 396 (emphasis in original); see 
also WILKINSON ET AL. (1903), supra note 78, at 1109–10; WILKINSON ET AL. (1894), supra 
note 79, at 841–44. For further discussion of the failure of peace bonds to deter recidivism, 
see infra Part II.B.4. 
 114.  An Act to Amend Section Two Hundred and Forty-Three of the Penal Code, ch. 
ccxc, § 1, 1876 Codes of California 110 (effective Apr. 21, 1876). This rarely imposed 
provision allowing corporal punishment for wife beating was removed in 1881. See infra 
note 118 (discussing changes in the potential penalties for battery). Some other American 
states enacted misdemeanor wife-beating statutes. See State v. Harrigan, 55 A. 5, 5 (1902) 
(citing 22 Del. Laws 493 (1901)). 
 115. For defendants given a choice between a monetary penalty or a jail term, see A 
Sailor Canes His Wife, supra note 86, col. F, at 3 (noting that, in December 1882, a wife 
beater was fined $100, in default of which he would be jailed for fifty days); A Wife-Beater 
Sentenced, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), June 8, 1863, at col. B (stating that Matthew 
McQuinn must pay $100 or be imprisoned for fifty days for “throwing his wife and child 
around the room” while intoxicated); Tries to Slay with an Ax, L.A. TIMES, Mar, 2, 1907, at 
II11 (reporting that a drunken man was sentenced to a $60 fine or sixty days in jail for 
assaulting his wife with an axe); Wife Beater Sentenced, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1929, at 11 
(stating that a wife beater was sentenced to a $100 fine or one hundred days in jail); Woman 
Beaters Heavily Sentenced, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Nov. 9, 1871, at col. D 
(reporting that Harris Altman received a fine of $150 or seventy-five days in jail for “an 
outrageous assault on his wife”). For defendants sent to jail without being offered a 
monetary penalty instead, see A Wife Beater Punished, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), 
Aug. 10, 1871, at col. E (noting that a wife beater was sent to jail for four months for an 
assault on his wife); Doings of the Police Court, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Nov. 13, 
1861, at col. D (reporting a thirty-day jail sentence for assault and battery upon a wife); Wife 
Beater Jailed, supra note 86, at G10 (recording a six-month jail sentence for a wife beater); 
Wife Beater Sentenced, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 1900, at II5 (stating that a guilty plea resulted 
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states.116 The American response was thus more severe than Australia’s, in the 
sense that domestic violence defendants could expect to incur nonrefundable 
monetary penalties or to spend days or even months behind bars. Yet, unlike 
Australian magistrates, courts in California and other western states tended to 
discharge defendants without even requiring sureties if their wives wanted to drop 
the charges.117  
Fines for wife-beating ranged from $5 to $1000 throughout the entire period 
(1860–1930), with the most common amounts being $50 to $200. These sentences 
fell within the statutory range applicable to any assault or battery; they did not 
constitute a special approach taken in wife-beating cases.118 Interestingly, the 
monetary penalty for assaulting one’s wife did not increase over the seventy-year 
period covered by this Article, despite changes in the value of money. When 
Elbridge Hopkins was fined $100 for throwing vitriol on his wife in 1862, that sum 
would have been worth about $2200 in today’s money.119 R.E. Carroll’s $100 fine 
for wife-beating in 1929 corresponds to only about $1200 today but was associated 
with a lesser conviction than Hopkins’s (simple assault, as opposed to assault and 
battery).120 In any event, these monetary penalties were not trivial. 
Many Californians who inflicted physical injury on their wives were imprisoned 
for several months. A statutory amendment in 1881 permitted offenders convicted 
of battery to be sentenced to both a fine and incarceration, and in 1911, the 
legislature increased the potential jail term for simple assault to six months, which 
could be combined with a monetary penalty.121 Indeed, although some scholars 
assert that the Progressives decriminalized domestic violence, Los Angeles courts 
                                                                                                                 
in a ninety-day jail term for a man who beat his wife with a club). 
 116. See Oregon News Items, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), July 20, 1881, col. F, at 
4 (noting that a man in Oregon was “fined $50, and in default was sent to the County Jail” 
for assault and battery on his wife); Untitled, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Apr. 
6, 1882, at col. C (stating that a Colorado defendant received a forty-day jail sentence for 
beating and choking his wife).  
 117. See infra notes 186–88 and accompanying text (discussing the dismissal or down-
charging of cases due to the victim’s refusal to prosecute). 
 118. Starting in the 1850s, simple assault was punishable by a fine not exceeding $500 or 
by imprisonment not exceeding three months. 1855 Cal. Stat. § 243, at 220. According to a 
statutory amendment in 1911, the court could impose both a fine and incarceration, and the 
possible jail term was increased to six months. 1911 Cal. Stat. § 241, at 687. From 1850, a 
conviction for battery, which encompassed “the unlawful beating of another,” resulted in a 
fine not exceeding $1000 or imprisonment in county jail for up to one year. 1850 Cal. Stat. § 
51, at 234. In 1881, the potential penalty for battery was amended to allow both incarceration 
and a fine, and the provision permitting the corporal punishment of wife beaters was 
removed. 1881 Cal. Stat. § 243, at 10 (Desty 1881). 
 119. Vitriol Throwing, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Oct. 27, 1862, at col. C. The 
value of the fine in 2010 was calculated using the Consumer Price Index, which measures 
the change in the cost of a bundle of goods and services purchased by the average urban 
consumer. Calculator available at http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare. 
 120. Wife Beater Sentenced, supra note 115. The value of the fine in 2010 was calculated 
using the Consumer Price Index, which measures the change in the cost of a bundle of goods 
and services purchased by the average urban consumer. Calculator available at 
http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare. 
 121. See supra note 118 (describing the penalties for battery and simple assault). 
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continued to impose jail time on wife beaters throughout the 1920s.122 Assaults on 
female intimates resulted in prison sentences of up to two years when deadly 
weapons were involved.123 
Although some cases originated with the abused wife’s complaint, neighbors 
and bystanders in the American West seem to have taken a more active role in 
reporting domestic violence throughout the period covered by this Article than they 
did in either the urban American Northeast or Australia.124 In a California case in 
1860, a man beat his screaming spouse “until the neighbors came to her rescue” 
and called the police; “[t]he woman was [then] given shelter in another house” for 
fear she would pay with her life “for the sin of letting her neighbors know . . . how 
family matters went on.”125 Relatives also initiated charges against batterers.126 
Beyond calling the police, neighbors and family members might intervene 
physically in domestic violence. For example, a California woman threatened a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. Some wife beaters in the 1920s received six-month jail terms. See Beater of Wife 
Gets Full Term, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1927, at A13; Gets Six Months on Wife-Beating Charge, 
L.A. TIMES, May 23, 1924, at A5; Wife-Beater Jailed, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1923, at I15; 
Wife-Beater Sent to Cell, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1924, at 10. Others spent less time behind bars 
but still received custodial sentences. See Husband Gets 120 Days as Wife Beater, L.A. 
TIMES, June 21, 1927, at A7 (recording a 120-day sentence for wife beating and nearly as a 
severe a penalty for Prohibition violations); Husband Sent to Jail, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 
1928, at A9 (noting a sixty-day sentence for wife beating); Placed in Jail for Wife-Beating 
Task, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1923, at II10 (stating that a wife beater received a ninety-day jail 
sentence); Wife Beater Goes to Jail, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1928, at A3 (reporting a sixty-day 
jail term for wife beater). Indeed, the likelihood that a wife beater would be incarcerated at 
least briefly seems to have been high in the 1920s. See Man Beats His Wife to Get Jail Meal, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1928, at 6 (“[H]e knew if he would beat his wife, he would be arrested, 
jailed, and fed.”). But see supra note 12 (citing legal histories that associate the Progressive 
Era with the decriminalization of domestic violence). 
 123. See Griffith Sentenced to “Pen” and Fined, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1904, at A2 
(reporting that defendant received the maximum sentence of two years for assaulting his 
wife with a loaded revolver); see also People v. Griffith, 80 P. 68 (Cal. 1905) (affirming the 
conviction). The authorized penalty for assault with a deadly weapon in California from 
1850 to 1921 was a two-year prison term, a fine not exceeding $5000, or both. See 1850 Cal. 
Stat. 234. In 1921, the legislature increased the potential prison term to ten years. 1921 Cal. 
Stat. 86.  
 124. For a discussion of neighborly reluctance to intervene in intimate-partner violence in 
nineteenth-century Australia, see infra note 217 and accompanying text. The decreased 
ability of abused women in New York to rely on neighborly assistance is discussed in 
Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 30, at 165–68. Pamela Haag also notes that 
“[w]orking-class women’s willingness to risk personal injury in protecting one another from 
domestic violence” diminished in New York City in the late 1870s. Pamela Haag, “The Ill-
Use of a Wife”: Patterns of Working-Class Violence in Domestic and Public New York City, 
1860–1880, 25 J. SOC. HIST. 447, 469 (1992). Similarly, Linda Gordon’s study of wife 
beating in Boston documents greater support and assistance from abused women’s relatives 
than from their neighbors. GORDON, supra note 12, at 278–79. 
 125. Gerholdt Playing the Model Husband, supra note 94. 
 126. See, e.g., Wife-Beating Charge Filed, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1926, at A6 (reporting that 
the defendant’s mother-in-law alerted the police to his beating and false imprisonment of his 
wife). 
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man with a shotgun when he came into her house to assault his wife, who was 
hiding there.127 Wife beaters were sometimes taken into custody by private 
citizens,128 and mobs occasionally imposed extralegal punishments, such as tarring 
and feathering the offending husband or forcing him to ride a rail.129 Some of these 
incidents morphed into fights between men,130 as did arrests by police officers that 
wife beaters resisted.131  
The police continued to respond to reports of wife beating from neighbors and 
family members in the early twentieth century.132 State intervention was not limited 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. Saved Wife a Beating, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1904, at A10; cf. Shot Down by His Son, 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1904, at 4 (reporting that neighbors shielded an eleven-year-old boy, 
who shot his abusive father to defend his mother, and that they “made no secret of the fact 
that they approved of his act”); Wife Beater and His Victim, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1904, at A2 
(stating that a wife beater’s teenaged son hit him with a shovel to stop the battering of his 
mother). 
 128. In 1868, a group of railroad workers responded to a Sacramento woman’s cries by 
entering her abode, taking her husband to the stationhouse, and calling for a physician. See 
Murderous Assault by a Husband, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), May 28, 1868, at col. 
H; see also Savage Assault, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Oct. 18, 1870, at col. C 
(reporting that, when Roger Dockery beat and kicked his wife on a public street, “a 
gentleman arrested him and took him away”). 
 129. Ridden on a Rail, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Jan. 9, 1890, at col. E; 
see also Albina’s Contribution: A Wife Beater That Had Better Look a Little Out, MORNING 
OREGONIAN (Portland), Oct. 21, 1889, col. C, at 8 (reporting that neighbors threatened a wife 
beater with tarring and feathering); Tar and Feathers, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, 
Colo.), Oct. 21, 1889, col. D, at 6 (same). 
 130. A San Francisco newspaper published a report about a man charged with wife 
beating and assault on a neighbor: 
The testimony showed that [Thomas] Mullen, within his own castle, was 
enjoying himself by threshing his wife; and that [Peter] Robinson, among 
others, heard what was going on, went to the house and told Mullen he ought to 
be ashamed of himself. . . . Mullen was aroused, and in no mood to tolerate 
such invidious remarks; so he came to the door and transferred his attentions to 
Robinson. Robinson, who said that he had often given work to Mullen, simply 
out of pity to his wife and family, gave back better blows than he received.  
Local Matters: Wife-Whipping and Choking, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), June 5, 
1860, at col. B; see also A Thumper Thumped: A Cowardly Wife Beater Who Got Beautifully 
Whipped, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, Colo.), July 21, 1888, col. D, at 2 (reporting 
that a bystander severely beat “a cowardly wife beater” in Denver, Colorado); Wife-Beater 
Drury’s Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1900, at II5 (describing how a Santa Ana, California man 
got into a violent fight with a neighbor when he intervened in a bout of wife beating). 
 131. See Bob Hatfield Shot Dead, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1901, at 3 (reporting that a 
sheriff’s deputy killed a man in a mining camp near Globe, Arizona, while attempting to 
arrest him for wife beating); Man Killed by a Policeman in Sacramento, DAILY EVENING 
BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Dec. 19, 1861, at col. C (stating that a police officer fatally shot a wife 
beater who attacked him with an axe while resisting arrest); Sent to Hades: A Lake City 
Wife-Beater Shot by the Officers, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Sept. 20, 1883, 
at col. C (noting that deputy city marshals killed a Colorado wife beater after he fired at 
them).  
 132. See For Wife Beating, supra note 86; Wife-Beating, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1904, at 
B11; Wife-Beating Charge Filed, supra note 126, at A6. 
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to violence against dutiful wives who remained at home with their husbands. 
Rather, courts also fined men for trying to exercise authority over estranged 
spouses.133 At the onset of the twentieth century, for example, a jealous male 
defendant whose spouse had obtained a divorce but then continued to live with 
him, as well as to date other men, received this stern rebuke from a Los Angeles 
judge: “Whatever the provocation of your wife, you had no right to assault her. If 
you couldn’t stand her manner of living, this is a large country, and you could have 
gone to other parts . . . .”134 
Women rarely appeared as defendants on domestic assault charges, but when 
they did, the outcomes of their cases in Australia differed from those in the 
American West. Australian courts typically ordered female defendants to post 
peace bonds or imposed other penalties comparable to those for men,135 whereas 
magistrates in the American West refused to take husband beating seriously. A San 
Francisco police court dismissed a complaint against the wife of a sailor, for 
example, telling the beaten man that “his remedy lay in divorce.”136 The few 
American women tried for assault with a deadly weapon were typically acquitted, 
and judges censured the men involved for failing to live up to ideals of economic 
productivity and temperance.137 Even Australian courts, which viewed violent 
wives as serious transgressors, made efforts to ascertain whether the husband had 
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. Police Court Record, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), May 24, 1871, at col. E. 
 134. Father and Son in County Jail, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1901, at 10.  
 135. See Assault, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Nov. 25, 1864, at 6 (reporting that Johanna 
Holland, charged with assaulting her husband, was ordered to provide a surety for £20 to 
keep the peace towards him for three months); Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Aug. 
11, 1868, at 6 (“Mary Williamson, brought up on warrant at the instance of her husband, 
James Williamson, was shown to be a drunken virago, who had broken the unfortunate 
man’s head with a bottle.”); Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Jan. 16, 1862, at 5 
(“Catherine Powell, charged with threatening her husband’s head and limbs with an 
American axe, was ordered to find two sureties to keep the peace towards him.”). 
 136. Double, Double, Toil and Trouble, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Nov. 21, 
1863, col. C, at 5 (noting the court’s dismissive attitude toward a man named Double, who 
complained his wife had “pulled his ears and whiskers” and “was in the constant habit of 
beating him”).  
 137. See A Mean Deception, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), July 27, 1874, at Issue 
94, col. B (reporting that a husband-beating case had been dismissed for lack of evidence 
and that the intemperate husband injured himself with a handsaw); Police Court, DAILY 
EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Feb. 13, 1875, at col. A (stating that Helena Bose acted in self-
defense against her husband, “a worthless vagabond who had been dependent upon his wife 
for support”); see also A Badgered Woman Escapes Punishment, DAILY EVENING BULL. 
(S.F., Cal.), Nov. 24, 1888, at col. F (noting that a jury promptly acquitted Mary Murphy of 
assault with a deadly weapon against her ex-husband); Two Acquittals: Charges of a Serious 
Character Disproved in Court, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Apr. 1, 1887, col. C, at 2 
(reporting that Johanna Henry was acquitted of having struck her husband with a hatchet). 
But see San Diego County: Woman Sent to the Penitentiary, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1901, at 15 
(stating that Stella Lynch received a two-year prison sentence for assaulting her former 
husband with a deadly weapon). 
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actually inflicted the most serious abuse before declaring the guilt or innocence of a 
female defendant.138 
2. Cases Involving Intent to Kill 
After an arrest occurred, if there was evidence of homicidal purpose, the 
prosecutor typically charged the defendant with a more serious crime—attempted 
murder, shooting with intent to kill, wounding with intent to murder, assault with 
intent to kill, or the like. Conviction for such crimes in both the American West and 
Australia resulted in a substantial prison sentence, rather than simply a peace bond 
or a fine. Courts in Victoria imposed incarceration for one to twenty years, and 
California sentences were comparable. Indeed, it was not uncommon for male 
defendants to be sentenced near the top of the possible range for crimes involving 
intent to kill their wives.139 New South Wales even mandated capital punishment 
for some forms of attempted murder until 1955.140 However, death sentences in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 138. See Assaulting a Husband, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Mar. 19, 1864, at 6 (stating 
that Anne Wright’s case would be remanded for a week to allow her to gather evidence that 
her husband “had ill-treated her in many ways”); Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Oct. 
10, 1862, at 5 (reporting that the Fitzroy police magistrate determined that a female 
defendant threw a ladle at her husband only after considerable provocation from the 
recidivist wife beater). 
 139. In California, assault with intent to commit murder was punishable by a prison term 
of one to fourteen years throughout the period covered by this Article. 1850 Cal. Stat. 234. 
For examples of male defendants in California who received severe punishment for such 
crimes, see A Plea of Insanity, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Apr. 6, 1882, at col. C 
(recording Francis DeCleer’s fourteen-year prison term for assault with intent to murder his 
wife); State News in Brief, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), July 22, 1879, at col. D 
(stating that John Ashcroft [a.k.a. Ashcraft] received a fourteen-year sentence for trying to 
kill his wife when she filed for divorce); cf. San Berdoo Briefs, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1905, at 
II8 (indicating that Fred Valenzuela’s two-year prison term for assaulting his wife with 
intent to murder her was merciful due to his ill health); San Bernardino Briefs, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 25, 1906, at IV12 (noting a comparable example of mercy for a sick defendant).  
  Australian courts also imposed long sentences in cases in which the prosecution 
showed intent to kill. See, e.g., Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Oct. 12, 1868, at 5 
(reporting that Edwin Chadwick was sentenced to twenty years’ penal servitude for the 
attempted murder of his wife). Defendants could sometimes escape such harsh penalties by 
pleading guilty to lesser offenses. See, e.g., Coversheet, Queen v. Johnston, Case 5, Unit 319 
(1866), Criminal Trial Briefs, VPRS 30/P/0, Public Record Office Victoria (PROV) (copy 
on file with author) (recording that, after initially being charged with stabbing his de facto 
wife with intent to murder her, defendant pleaded guilty to wounding with intent to do 
grievous bodily harm and was sentenced to twelve months in jail with hard labor); cf. 
Coversheet, Queen v. Turnbull, a.k.a. Vance, Unit 319 (1867), Criminal Trial Briefs, VPRS 
30/P/0, PROV (copy on file with author) (noting that, although a female defendant was 
charged with wounding her husband with intent to murder him, she received a four-year 
sentence for the lesser offense of wounding with intent to do grievous harm).  
 140. Strange, supra note 45, at 43; see PLUNKETT & WILKINSON (1860), supra note 69, at 
28 (citing 1 Vic., c. 5, s. 2); WILKINSON ET AL. (1903), supra note 78, at 184 (citing Crimes 
Act, No. 40, 1900, s. 27); WILKINSON ET AL. (1894), supra note 79, at 150 (citing 46 Vic., 
No. 17, s. 16). 
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intimate-partner cases tended to be commuted to imprisonment, and if the victim 
survived, the term actually imposed might be less than ten years.141  
Light sentences for male defendants convicted of attempted murder provoked 
controversy. For example, the Los Angeles Times expressed disappointment that an 
infamous batterer named Frank Toal received only a five-year sentence for trying to 
kill his wife when she separated from him.142 Similarly, while men of every class 
had reason to empathize with cuckolds, the Sydney Morning Herald criticized the 
executive for commuting a husband’s death sentence for a near-fatal attack on an 
alleged adulteress in 1904.143 Nevertheless these would-be murderers were 
convicted, not acquitted.  
When considering a man’s guilt, unwillingness to excuse or justify his attempt 
to kill a woman he was “in law and in honour bound to protect”144 stemmed from a 
growing cultural sense that such behavior was unmanly. Disapproval of violence 
against wives was even more prevalent in the American West than in Australia. 
Hence, feeling against habitual batterer Frank Toal ran high,145 and the Los Angeles 
Times ridiculed his feminine behavior behind bars: “Toal is confined in one of the 
women’s cells. He boo-hoos, and says he loves his wife too much to part with her; 
and that he wouldn’t have hurt her but for the whisky.”146 In the eyes of the legal 
authorities and the press, a man who misused the rights and duties of marriage by 
inflicting violence on his spouse lost his claim to be a true man. 
Many male defendants charged with attempted murder sought to introduce 
evidence of provocation or the victim’s bad character, but this strategy often failed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. The case of Ralph Evans provides an example. In New South Wales in 1904, Evans 
faced the charge of shooting his allegedly adulterous wife with intent to murder her. A jury 
convicted him but recommended mercy based on his “previous good . . . character, kind 
treatment of wife & child, and great provocation by wife’s disgraceful conduct.” Coversheet, 
Rex v. Evans, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit 
Courts, 9/7065 (1904, Central), State Record Office New South Wales (SRNSW) (copy on 
file with author). Evans’s death sentence was commuted to penal servitude for five years 
with leave to petition for release at the end of three years. Executive Council Minute Books, 
9/615 (1904), at 507, SRNSW (copy on file with author).  
 142. Frank Toal: The Brutal Wife-Carver and His Light Sentence, supra note 97, at 7. 
The newspaper expressed further outrage when Governor Waterman pardoned the prisoner 
after only one year in San Quentin. Frank Toal: A Most Brutal Performance at His 
Residence, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1889, at 6; see San Quentin Prison Register (Frank Toal, SQ 
#13665), California State Archives, Office of the Secretary of State, Sacramento, CA 
(recording Toal’s pardon) (copy on file with author). For more on Toal’s long career of 
terrorizing his wife, her reluctance to prosecute, and the public’s animosity toward him, 
including threats of lynching, see infra notes 145–46, 181–85 and accompanying text. 
 143. Strange, supra note 45, at 323–25 (discussing Rex v. Evans and noting the Sydney 
Morning Herald’s criticism of the commutation of Ralph Evans’s death sentence to five 
years’ penal servitude). In contrast, Truth defended the decision, vilifying the victim and 
casting the attempted murder as justifiable. See id. at 324. 
 144. See id. at 323 (quoting a December 1904 editorial in the Sydney Morning Herald). 
 145. Is It Murder?: Frank Toal Caps the Climax of Long Brutality, by Hideously Carving 
His Wife, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 1885, at 4. For threats to lynch Toal, see infra note 218. 
 146. Mrs. Toal: Condition of the Unfortunate Woman Yesterday, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 
1885, at 3. 
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as a matter of law. For example, in a California case, Bill Arnold claimed he 
dragged his Indian wife from her horse and attacked her with a rock and a knife 
because he suspected that she planned to ride to town to consort with other men.147 
The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge’s refusal to admit evidence 
of the suspected infidelity, however, on the ground that the defendant’s jealousy 
was based on mere conjecture.148 In any event, Arnold admitted that “he had been 
aware for some 18 months that she ‘was running with every Tom, Dick, and Harry’ 
. . . and yet had continued to live with her”—which showed he had not struck her in 
a sudden rage.149 Although Arnold was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, 
rather than the more serious charge of assault with intent to murder,150 other male 
defendants in California were not so fortunate.151 Nor was vilifying the victim 
guaranteed to lead to a merciful penalty for those convicted of attempted murder in 
Australia. When Edwin Chadwick cut his wife’s throat on a lonely stretch of road 
in Victoria, for instance, he received a twenty-year sentence even though the 
victim’s character “did not seem to be of the best.”152  
3. Victims’ Reluctance to Prosecute 
The relatively frequent use of noncustodial penalties for assault and battery in 
comparison to attempted murder and assaults involving deadly weapons and intent 
to kill might be construed as evidence of judicial reluctance to intervene in less 
serious intimate-partner violence. However, criticizing courts of the late 1800s and 
early 1900s for ignoring the plight of abused women risks underplaying the 
complexity of the social problem they faced and the extent to which they 
accommodated the wishes of victims who wanted the state’s involvement to stop 
short of a jail term. Similarly, law enforcers’ slow response time in some cases153 
may have been attributable to abused women’s reluctance to prosecute and punish 
their batterers, rather than to societal apathy toward domestic violence. Australian 
police manuals counseled officers not to arrest men for “minor assaults on their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. People v. Arnold, 48 P. 803, 803 (Cal. 1897). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 804. 
 150. Id. at 803. 
 151. For example, in 1879, John Ashcroft (a.k.a. Ashcraft) received a fourteen-year term 
in state prison for attempting to murder his wife with a hatchet when she filed for divorce. 
State News in Brief, supra note 139 (reporting the defendant’s sentence); see Brutal Attempt 
at Murder, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), May 21, 1879, at col. I (describing the facts of 
the case). 
 152. Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Oct. 12, 1868, at 5. 
 153. For example, in the late 1880s, a pregnant mother of ten named Kate Magee had 
been “bothering the life out of a Prosecuting Attorney’s Assistant in order to obtain a 
warrant for the arrest of her husband” before the “huge, broad-shouldered fellow” was 
finally brought to a San Francisco court on battery charges and fined $20. Family Troubles: 
A Woman Procures the Arrest and Conviction of Her Husband, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., 
Cal.), May 29, 1889, at col. C. But see Completes His Sentence, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1907, 
at II3 (reporting that, in another case, the police “answered a hurry call . . . and arrived there 
in time to catch the [offender] dragging his wife around the house by the hair of her head and 
kicking her in the stomach”). 
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wives, but the latter [was] advised to apply to a magistrate for a summons.”154 A 
leading treatise further recommended a delay between the serving of the summons 
and the defendant’s court date “as these summary charges are frequently made by 
parties under sudden excitement.”155 However, while officers occasionally avoided 
helping women perceived to defy traditional family ideals,156 the unwillingness of 
victims to follow through in criminal cases seems to have been a more important 
factor in shaping police responses. 
Like the press, many officers and judges disapproved of brutal husbands. A Los 
Angeles police captain declared, “[a] man who strikes a woman is no good at heart. 
If he does it when he is drunk, he is doubly a beast, and if he does it when sober, 
there is no punishment hard enough for him.”157 In an Australian case involving a 
husband who beat, kicked, and trampled his estranged spouse after she left him and 
established a de facto marriage with another man, the trial court commented that “it 
was an unmanly act to treat a woman the way [the defendant] had done.”158 The 
judge imposed a six-month jail term, despite the jury’s recommendation of 
mercy.159 In that case, incarcerating the defendant harmonized with the wishes of 
the victim, who had instigated the prosecution and found another man to provide 
for her and her children.  
More often, however, a punitive approach conflicted with the preferences of 
abused women, even though they initially sought the state’s protection.160 When 
                                                                                                                 
 
 154. ALLEN, SEX AND SECRETS, supra note 15, at 114 (quoting a 1905 police handbook 
from New South Wales). 
 155. WILKINSON ET AL. (1894), supra note 79, at 508. The same language also appeared 
in the 1903 edition. WILKINSON ET AL. (1903), supra note 78, at 665. 
 156. For instance, two lower-class women living apart from their husbands in Bathurst, 
New South Wales, in the 1910s unsuccessfully sought protection from death threats and 
stalking behavior by one of their spouses. At an inquest into the shooting of Jemima Jenkins 
by her husband, Jemima’s friend and housemate testified that she “sent a message to the 
police station for a constable to come. I sent the message by my son James Wilson. No 
constable came.” Deposition of Mary Wilson, Coroner’s Inquest at 26, Rex v. Jenkins, Clerk 
of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7204 
(1915, Bathurst), SRNSW (copy on file with author). 
 157. Give Lash to Such Brutes, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1908, at II9. 
 158. Aggravated Assault, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Oct. 11, 1860, at 5. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See Brief Mention, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), July 7, 1883, at col. D (“The 
charge of assault to murder brought against Thomas Seawell . . . by his wife and sister-in-
law has been dismissed by the Police Judge, the complainants declining to prosecute.”); 
Wife-Beaters, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Aug. 7, 1860, at col. B (reporting that a 
California man “was arrested on the complaint of his wife for assault and battery,” but “[s]he 
did not care to prosecute to day”); see also At the Trouble Bureau, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 
1903, at A7 (stating that a wife-beating charge against Marino Cessares “was withdrawn on 
his wife’s motion”); Brief Mention, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Mar. 1, 1883, at col. 
B (noting the dismissal of a case of assault with a deadly weapon due to the wife’s refusal to 
prosecute); Police Court, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Dec. 22, 1874, at col. E (stating 
that a husband was fined only $5 for assault and battery, “his wife refusing to prosecute”); 
Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Mar. 1, 1864, at 5 (recording that the Australian case 
against John Kelly, a man who threw a knife at his wife, was withdrawn because she did not 
want to press the charge); Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Sept. 29, 1862, at 5 (stating 
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repeat offender Robert Clelland pursued his wife with a drawn sword, for example, 
a Victoria police magistrate said: 
[H]e felt it [was] his duty to protect defendant’s unfortunate wife from 
his violence; this was not the first offence, and the only way to stop 
defendant’s violence appeared to be to lock him up in gaol. . . . [But] 
the wife stated that sending him to gaol did him no good, if the Bench 
would only allow him to go to New Zealand it would be much better.161 
In many cases, the victim’s goal seems to have been to extract a promise from her 
husband in open court that he would “behave better in future”162 and to teach him a 
lesson through pretrial detention.163 She sought to use the criminal justice system to 
interrupt his coercive control over her, if only temporarily, without enduring the 
hardships to herself and her family that his conviction and imprisonment would 
inflict. 
Judges were generally sympathetic to the abused wife’s dilemma. When women 
explained why they opposed the criminal prosecution of their violent husbands, 
they often mentioned lingering affection for their mates or their belief that alcohol 
caused their mates’ brutality.164 Yet, courts could see behind these rote expressions 
of forgiveness to the other reasons the victim feared pressing her case, such as her 
fear that “if the husband went to jail their little ones would go hungry.”165 Indeed, 
for myriad legal, social, and cultural reasons, judges and juries in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s may have found a wife’s inability to escape an abusive marriage more 
understandable than they did later in the twentieth century. The condemnation of 
                                                                                                                 
that Mary Jenkins, the victim of an “assault of a very savage nature . . . is keeping out of the 
way, in order not to be made to appear against her husband”). In the rare cases involving 
assaults on husbands, men also tended to seek dismissal of charges against their wives. See, 
e.g., A Forgiving Husband, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Oct. 12, 1889, at col. F (“The 
woman was locked up on a charge of assault with a deadly weapon, but the husband says he 
is willing to forgive her for her hasty action and will not prosecute.”). 
 161. A Wife-Beater, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Sept. 12, 1862, at 6. Acceding to the 
abused woman’s entreaties, “the Bench ordered defendant to enter into bail in the sum of £50 
to keep the peace, especially towards his wife.” Id. 
 162. Wife-Beating, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Dec. 15, 1868, at Supp. 1. 
 163. See Girl Wife Refuses to Prosecute, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 1925, at 6. 
 164. See Assaulting a Wife, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Sept. 19, 1864, at 6 (stating that 
the defendant “had promised to use her differently, and the witness was desirous of 
withdrawing her charge”); Love Conquers, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1907, at II2 (“He is a good 
man, and I was perhaps hasty in swearing to the charges. I don’t want him to have to go to 
jail on my account.”); Wife-Beating, supra note 162, at Supp. 1 (stating that the victim 
“asked that the Bench would not punish her husband, as he never thrashed her except when 
he was drunk”); see also Going to a Higher Court, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Aug. 
1, 1873, at col. E (reporting that the court dismissed an indictment against Thomas Devine 
for assault with a deadly weapon “at the earnest intercession of the woman, her husband 
being at the door of death from consumption”). 
 165. See Gave Him a Chance, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1901, at 10. The battered woman in 
this case appears to have been candid about the financial stress that prompted her to seek 
mercy for her husband. At her entreaties, the judge imposed only a fifty-day suspended 
sentence, although he normally “[did] not look upon wife-beating with the least degree of 
allowance.” Id. 
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domestic violence had not translated into a widespread commitment to support 
female autonomy in other ways. “The law of coverture rendered wives unequal, 
subordinate, and dependent throughout most of the nineteenth century.”166 While 
the legal grounds for divorce had been expanded, women who sought to obtain one 
still faced significant social and procedural hurdles.167 Moreover, battered wives 
“negotiated living with their husbands not as individuals but as mothers responsible 
for children.”168 If they divorced their abusers, they had to find a way 
simultaneously to be caregivers and wage-earners in an economy that had little 
place for female workers. They also risked violent retaliation by their estranged 
husbands.169  
The criminal law did not provide a simple panacea either. The imprisonment of 
parents placed children in great distress. In one Australian case, deemed to be a 
mutual assault, the judge incarcerated the couple for three months, due to their 
inability to post sureties, and also placed the children in jail, claiming 
imprisonment was the best way to protect them.170 Yet, in the more typical scenario 
where the man received the blame, courts usually recognized that incarcerating a 
violent husband meant removing the main source of financial support from the 
family.171 Some American politicians and police officers advocated whipping-post 
laws on the ground that the corporal punishment of abusive men would impose a 
lesser economic burden on their wives and children than incarceration. President 
Theodore Roosevelt declared in his State of the Union Address in 1904: “The wife-
beater . . . is inadequately punished by imprisonment; for imprisonment may often 
mean nothing to him, while it may cause hunger and want to the wife and children 
who have been the victims of his brutality.”172 Similarly, according to a Los 
Angeles police captain: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166. Ramsey, Provoking Change, supra note 43, at 51 (citations omitted). 
 167. Post-bellum feminist and temperance leader Lucy Stone pointed out that most 
women could not afford to hire a divorce lawyer. See PLECK, supra note 8, at 104. Moreover, 
divorces obtained out-of-state were still uncertain “in their extra-territorial effects, for 
reasons that . . . have much to do with a general cultural sensibility that marriage was a good 
thing while divorce a bad one.” HARTOG, supra note 17, at 258. For these and other reasons, 
battered women’s decisions to remain in violent marriages were often “interpreted as 
evidence of their commitment to fulfilling wifely duties.” GORDON, supra note 12, at 257. 
 168. GORDON, supra note 12, at 261. 
 169. See supra notes 134, 158 and accompanying text and infra notes 182, 201, 242, 281 
and accompanying text (discussing violent assaults on women following their attempts to 
divorce or separate from their husbands). 
 170. See Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Oct. 11, 1864, at 5 (discussing the Geddes 
case). 
 171. A trial judge in Victoria who sentenced a male defendant to two years’ 
imprisonment with hard labor “congratulated himself on being able to punish one case of 
wife-beating without injury to innocent persons, there being no children . . . to suffer for the 
errors of the husband.” The Warrenheip Outrage, supra note 95, at 5 (emphasis added). 
 172. Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. President, State of the Union Address to Congress (Dec. 
6, 1904), in 10 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS, 1789–1907, at 813 (1908). Some scholars argue that the whipping-post laws 
arose from a desire to enforce the power of the white male establishment over Indians, 
blacks, and immigrants, rather than from any genuine concern to protect women from 
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Convict a man of wife beating and send him to jail for a long time and 
you take away the support of his family. He eats three square meals a 
day and sleeps well and his wife and children have to get out and work 
like dogs for food and shelter.173 
Oregon passed a whipping-post law in 1905, and a sheriff there even announced 
that he planned to have abused women wield the lash themselves.174  
In fact, however, courts rarely imposed whipping as a punishment for wife 
beating in the few western states that briefly provided for it.175 By the early 
twentieth century, an alternative approach advocated in California involved 
sentencing the husband to hard labor, compensation for which would go to his wife 
and children as daily financial maintenance.176 
A second concern constraining criminal sentencing was the potential escalation 
of violence against the victim; women who complained to the courts about being 
assaulted faced a very real threat of physical retaliation. Melbourne’s Argus 
newspaper reported with disgust in 1862 that a man might be arrested for wife 
beating but, after providing a surety to the court, he would immediately “assault, 
kick, and nearly choke the unfortunate woman he had vowed to love and 
cherish.”177 Suspended sentences, which California courts sometimes imposed in 
the early twentieth century, had similar shortcomings, though the offender could be 
jailed immediately if he violated the conditions of the suspension.178 Imprisonment 
might not have a deterrent effect on the batterer either. The Los Angeles Times 
                                                                                                                 
domestic violence. See DAVID PETERSON DEL MAR, WHAT TROUBLE I HAVE SEEN: A 
HISTORY OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES 87, 95 (1996) [hereinafter PETERSON DEL MAR, 
WHAT TROUBLE I HAVE SEEN]; PLECK, supra note 8, at 111; Siegel, supra note 8, at 2136–
42. Considering evidence that wife beating met with widespread disapproval, however, such 
an allegation seems tenuous. For example, in early twentieth-century California, support for 
whipping-post laws coincided with indications that “[f]oreigners have formed the minority 
of offenders [in wife-beating cases], most of whom have been Americans.” Give Lash to 
Such Brutes, supra note 157. 
 173. Give Lash to Such Brutes, supra note 157. 
 174. Oregon’s Whipping Post, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 1905, at I6. 
 175. See PETERSON DEL MAR, WHAT TROUBLE I HAVE SEEN, supra note 172, at 77–78 
(discussing Oregon’s whipping-post law); supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing 
California’s earlier whipping-post law).  
 176. See Would Lessen Wife’s Burden, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1914, at II7 (discussing a 
proposal by a Los Angeles Police Court judge); see also Get Something Out of Nothing, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1913, at I3 (indicating that abused women liked such an arrangement when it 
was adopted in San Francisco). 
 177. Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Oct. 3, 1862, at 5 (describing George 
Campbell’s rapid return to wife beating following his appearance in police court on assault 
charges); see Untitled, AGE (Melbourne, Austl.), Nov. 27, 1874, at 2 (making a similar 
complaint about light penalties leading to recidivism in domestic assault cases). 
 178. See Wife Beater Draws Ninety-Day Sentence, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1923, at II7 
(reporting that Isadore Cohen was ordered to start serving his jail term at once when he beat 
his wife after being given a suspended sentence); see also Wife-Beating Habit of Mexican 
Broken, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1930, at 6 (stating that a Mexican defendant was back in court 
after he violated the terms of a ninety-day suspended sentence by continuing to batter his 
wife). 
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noted in 1908: “A jail sentence leaves him thirsty for revenge against the woman 
whom he blames for his stay behind bars.”179  
The understandable reluctance of victims to testify made the conviction of their 
abusers more difficult.180 The Los Angeles Times reported on a California woman 
who repeatedly returned to her abusive mate in the 1880s despite repeated 
battering:  
Mrs. Toal . . . refuses to leave her husband, and will never prosecute 
him. In fact, it is more than possible that when the present case comes 
up for trial, . . . she will say that she fell down on a bottle and cut 
herself, or make some other excuse.181  
The Times expressed dismay that, although Mrs. Toal had filed for divorce and 
gotten a restraining order, she still “kept forgiving [her husband] and refusing to 
prosecute,” despite being scalded, slashed, clubbed, and shot at.182 Indeed, in 1887, 
she petitioned the governor to pardon Toal from his assault-to-murder conviction, 
claiming that he attacked her “upon great provocation” and that she was “greatly to 
blame for the quarrel which resulted in the assault.”183 Moreover, she thought “her 
children and herself would be much better provided for if her said husband were 
with his family.”184 Based on this pattern of behavior, the Times predicted that the 
Toals “will then go to living together again, and the old routine of fighting and 
drinking will continue until it winds up with the death of the wife at the hands of 
the husband.”185  
From the 1860s through the early twentieth century, charges against batterers 
were sometimes dropped or reduced because victims declined to give evidence.186 
                                                                                                                 
 
 179. Give Lash to Such Brutes, supra note 157, at II9. 
 180. Although spouses were generally prohibited from testifying against each other in a 
criminal action to which one or both were parties, there was an exception allowing such 
testimony “in cases of criminal violence upon one by the other.” People v. Rader, 141 P. 
958, 961 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1914); see People v. Johnson, 98 P. 682, 682 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1908). 
 181. Frank Toal: A Most Brutal Performance at His Residence, supra note 142, at 6. 
 182. Mrs. Toal: Condition of the Unfortunate Woman Yesterday, supra note 146, at 3; see 
also Frank Toal: The Brutal Wife-Carver and His Light Sentence, supra note 97, at 4 
(reporting, in 1885, that Mrs. Toal had filed for divorce and obtained a restraining order 
against her husband).  
 183. Letter from Mary Ann Toal to R.W. Waterman, Governor of the State of California 
(Nov. 15, 1887) (copy on file with author); Application for Pardon # 4585 (Frank Toal), 
California State Archives, Office of the Secretary of State, Sacramento, CA (copy on file 
with author). 
 184. Letter from Mary Ann Toal to R.W. Waterman, supra note 183. 
 185. Frank Toal: A Most Brutal Performance at His Residence, supra note 142, at 6. 
 186. See Carving-Knife Fray Patched, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1927, at A5 (reporting that a 
judge discharged a defendant on a promise to “love, honor and obey” after his wife begged 
for him to be given another chance); Love Conquers, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1907, at II2 
(noting that two complaints of wife beating and child abuse were dismissed when the 
complainant “experienced a change of heart” in Police Court); Mrs. Sachs Disappears, 
DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Sept. 7, 1882, at col. D (reporting that the prosecuting 
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For example, California prosecutors did not pursue a felony charge against E.H. 
Phelan due to his victim’s refusal to testify. Phelan was instead prosecuted for 
simple battery, although the case was “one of the most brutal in the history of the 
[Los Angeles] police department.”187 Victim recantation might lead to acquittal if 
the case went to trial.188   
Nevertheless, the state sometimes pressed domestic assault charges in the face 
of victims’ noncooperation in both the American West and Australia. One 
Australian magistrate declared that “he would not allow the court to be used merely 
to threaten offending husbands.”189 Similar instances of judges imposing fines and 
even prison terms on male defendants, even though their female victims refused to 
assist the prosecution, occurred in the American West. When the wife of Theodore 
Costor appeared in a San Francisco court with a severely beaten face and said “she 
did not wish to prosecute him . . . the Court refused to allow a dismissal of the 
complaint.” 190 Police officers took the stand to testify about the beatings they had 
witnessed,191 and California judges even jailed a few recalcitrant victims for 
contempt to induce them to cooperate. For example, in 1922, Alysse LaClear spent 
a week behind bars for repeatedly refusing “to tell anything against her husband, 
who [was] charged with shooting her five times.”192  
                                                                                                                 
attorney was forced to drop an assault-to-murder case because the complainant “positively 
refused to prosecute her husband” and had left the state); Police Intelligence: Cases 
Dismissed, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Jan. 22, 1876, at col. C (“Joseph Costa’s wife 
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  The following two cases exemplify the situation in Australia: Assaulting a Wife, 
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(Melbourne, Austl.), Feb. 6, 1860, at Supp. 1 (noting that the most serious charges against 
John O’Brien were dropped because his wife “said she did not want to press the case”). 
 187. Brutal Husband Admits Guilt, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1907, at II6.  
 188. See Husband Said to Have Shot Wife Is Free, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 1924, at 3 
(reporting that a jury acquitted Walter Peterson of assault with a deadly weapon after his 
wife recanted her prior testimony that he had been drinking and “endeavored in every way 
possible to free him of the charge that might mean a penitentiary term”). 
 189. Husbands and Wives, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Dec. 19, 1862, at 7 (discussing 
the case of defendant Charles Kemp). 
 190. A Brutal Husband, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Dec. 26, 1871, at col. G; see 
Police Court, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Feb. 3, 1875, at col. C (reporting that a man 
was fined $5 for wife beating after the victim refused to prosecute); Police Court, DAILY 
EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Dec. 22, 1874, at col. E (same); San Bernardino and Orange: 
Jury Favors a Wife Beater, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1904, at A6 (reporting that the defendant 
might have gotten a sentence more severe than six months in jail if his wife had not refused 
to cooperate in the prosecution); see also Wounded Wife in Futile Plea for Probation, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1924, at A3 (stating that a man received a two-year jail term and a $300 fine 
for stabbing his wife, even though she begged for him to be placed on probation). 
 191. See, e.g., Wife Whipper, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), July 18, 1871, at col. C 
(reporting that a battered wife “did not desire to prosecute, but the officer testified to the 
beating, and the Court finally ordered him [the defendant] to pay a fine of $50 or go to jail”). 
 192. Loyal Wife Could Not Block Case, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1922, at II10. 
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Judges’ willingness to punish abusive men without the assistance of their 
victims provides evidence of strong social and legal disapproval of domestic 
violence. However, the discharge of the defendant was the most common outcome 
in cases of victim noncooperation. Although this Article demonstrates that the state 
intervened more strenuously in violent families in the late 1800s and early 1900s 
than other scholars have recognized, the aggressiveness of such intervention still 
pales by comparison to that under modern mandatory arrest laws and no-drop 
prosecution policies.  
Support for a tougher stance in the late twentieth century arose from legitimate 
concerns that, unless police and prosecutors were required to pursue criminal 
charges, cases would continue to be dropped, batterers would control the process, 
and in the end, they would not be held accountable for their crimes.193 Many 
feminists have subsequently criticized mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution 
for denying women’s autonomy.194 These feminist claims that battered women 
should be treated as survivors, rather than as helpless victims, differ ideologically 
from the values of civilized manhood and protectiveness toward women articulated 
in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Yet, somewhat ironically, the new feminist 
critique of overly aggressive state intervention resonates with the dilemma that 
nineteenth-century police, prosecutors, and courts faced—how to prevent domestic 
violence without rendering battered women less safe than they would have been if 
the state had not intervened. 
4. Recidivism and Escalation to Homicide 
Responding to intimate-partner assaults with peace bonds and fines was a dismal 
failure. In 1862, a police court in Victoria required sword-wielding Robert Clelland 
to post a bond of £50 to keep the peace against his wife.195 Yet, over the next four 
years, he appeared before magistrates on domestic violence charges at least three 
times—each time providing a recognizance or sureties and promising to reform.196 
In one of many such incidents, the magistrate also issued a protection order on 
behalf of Eliza Clelland, but “the order . . . had been lost, and had lapsed.”197 
                                                                                                                 
 
 193. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in 
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1888–89 (1996) (making similar 
arguments in favor of no-drop prosecution). 
 194. See SUK, supra note 8, at 14, 36–37 (describing the rise of mandatory arrest laws 
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 195. See A Wife Beater, supra note 93, at 6 and text accompanying note 161 (discussing 
the victim’s opposition to jailing her abuser). 
 196. See Assault, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Sept. 22, 1866, at 6; Assaulting a Wife, 
ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), June 8, 1866, at 6; Assaulting a Wife, ARGUS (Melbourne, 
Austl.), May 10, 1864, at 6. 
 197. Assaulting a Wife, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), May 10, 1864, at 6. 
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I have not found any record of whether Robert eventually killed Eliza. However, 
court papers and news articles from both the American West and Australia tell the 
tragic story of other women whose husbands were fined, bound over to keep the 
peace, or briefly jailed, only to escalate their attacks to murder. During the 1880s, 
for example, police officers brought F.W. (a.k.a. William) Williams to the city 
prison in Los Angeles on several occasions “for being drunk and disorderly and for 
beating his wife.”198 The abused woman complained “that he would kill her, as he 
had threatened her life a number of times.”199 But despite her entreaties, Williams 
and a drunken companion were released after being ordered to pay a fine.200 
Nothing further was heard of the family until Williams murdered his spouse to 
prevent her from leaving the marriage.201  
A similarly terrible escalation of violence occurred in the next century in New 
South Wales. In 1930, a jury convicted Sidney Solomon of murdering his pregnant 
wife, Roma, who had left him and returned to her parents.202 Sidney had been 
convicted the previous year of assault and given a typical sentence: he was required 
to enter his own recognizance of £10 to keep the peace toward his wife for twelve 
months.203 In default of entering the recognizance, he would be imprisoned with 
hard labor for seven days and required to pay costs; and in default of paying costs, 
he would be imprisoned with hard labor for two weeks.204 Roma had taken him to 
court because she “couldn’t stand things as they were any longer,” but she 
promised to let him see the baby “as soon as it comes along.”205 At the time of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 198. The Inquest, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1887, at 1. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. 
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see Deposition of Bernard Montgomery Garland, Coroner’s Inquest at 14, Rex v. Solomon, 
Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7321 
(1930, Central), SRNSW (copy on file with author). See also Deposition of Grace Jean Peck, 
Coroner’s Inquest at 5, Rex v. Solomon, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the 
Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7321 (1930, Central), SRNSW (copy on file with 
author) (noting that the victim was pregnant with twins when she was killed). For a brief 
mention of this case, see Ramsey, Provoking Change, supra note 43, at 49–50. 
 203. Certificate of Conviction (dated Jan. 3, 1930), Rex v. Solomon, Clerk of the Peace, 
Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7321 (1930, Central), 
SRNSW (copy on file with author) (providing the details of Sidney Solomon’s conviction 
for assaulting his wife on Nov. 15, 1929). 
 204. Id.  
 205. Letter from Roma Mary Solomon to Sidney Solomon (Dec. 18, 1929), Rex v. 
Solomon, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit 
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murder, the couple was living separately, and when Sidney appeared at his in-laws’ 
house, his father-in-law ordered him off the property, reminding him of a peace 
bond that was still in force.206 Sidney had brought a pistol though, and when Roma 
followed him into the street, he shot her to death.207 
The deaths of Roma Solomon and Annie Williams may not surprise readers, for 
the failure of the state to prevent the escalation of intimate-partner violence is a 
narrative that has often been recounted. Yet my analysis brings several new insights 
to historical understanding of the problem. First, beginning in the mid-nineteenth 
century, if not earlier, police and courts responded to wife beating by arresting and 
punishing the perpetrators. However ineffective their efforts, they were not 
tantamount to a policy of refusing to interfere in the privacy of the home. As 
Hendrik Hartog has noted:  
 The law created marriage as a husband’s private sphere. . . .  
 And yet the law also described the boundaries of that private sphere: 
when it would be penetrated by public power and when any sense of 
private autonomy should melt away, as a husband was remade as a 
dishonorable and unworthy man.208 
Second, when domestic assaults escalated to murder, male defendants received 
stern treatment. Both Sidney Solomon and F.W. Williams were sentenced to life in 
prison; indeed, Solomon only escaped the mandatory death penalty in New South 
Wales through executive commutation.209  
C. Homicides Committed by Men 
Murder cases in both Australia and the American West show that men asserted 
their respectable status by policing and punishing other men for killing women. 
Part I.C will demonstrate the following: Wife killings constituted a significant 
portion of the criminal docket.210 In both regions, the accused typically raised a 
defense of accident or insanity—either in lieu of, or in addition to, a provocation 
claim. Some insanity defenses in intimate-partner homicide cases resulted in 
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acquittals or a manslaughter “compromise,” but murder convictions and severe 
punishments seem to have been more common.211 Male murder defendants who 
routinely beat, threatened, or otherwise ill-used their wives proved especially 
unsympathetic to courts, juries, and the press.  
If the female victim had led a dissolute life, her death might be discounted. Yet 
women who simply left a bad marriage did not fit under this unsympathetic rubric, 
even if they had begun a partnership with another man. Courts interpreted the 
provocation category of witnessing adultery narrowly and literally, refusing to give 
manslaughter instructions in cases involving mere suspicion of infidelity or where 
the time lapse between the provocation and the killing had been too long. Thus, 
men actually had greater difficulty obtaining heat-of-passion mitigation in the late 
1800s and early 1900s than they do today under the expansive modern doctrines of 
provocation and extreme mental or emotional disturbance.212 In the past, courts and 
juries were more willing to see intimate-partner killings arising from sexual 
jealousy as purposive and premeditated, rather than spontaneous.213  
Despite these similarities between Australian and American cases, relevant 
differences existed. First, Australian judges and juries displayed greater empathy 
than did their American counterparts for male defendants who killed out of rage at 
unfaithful or insubordinate wives. This was perhaps due to the residue of the 
“damned whore”/respectable woman dichotomy from the convict era or to fear of 
female encroachment on such male prerogatives as sexual promiscuity and binge 
drinking.214 A second point, related to the first, is that popular condemnation of 
wife killers was more vociferous in the American West than in Australia. 
Australian crowds occasionally gathered to express outrage at wife beaters,215 and a 
few neighbors risked their lives to shelter abused women.216 But Australian 
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townsfolk more commonly expressed the view that, when a married couple fought, 
it was “just a little quarrel amongst themselves.”217 By contrast, neighbors not only 
intervened in violent relationships in California and other parts of the American 
West, but angry crowds also threatened to lynch men deemed to have been 
excessively violent toward female intimates, and some prisoners were actually 
killed by lynch mobs.218 Indeed, the punitive public response to wife killing in 
western American states may have sprung, in part, from the desire of legal elites to 
head off lynching and other private violence and to establish the state as the arbiter 
of criminal justice. Australia, by contrast, lacked a strong vigilante tradition.219  
1. Murder Convictions 
 
a. Wife Murderers in the American West 
I have previously demonstrated that in Denver County, Colorado, between 1880 
and 1920, about sixty percent of a sample of forty-six men charged with murdering 
their female intimates were convicted of first- or second-degree murder. Less than 
ten percent obtained voluntary manslaughter mitigation, and less than twenty 
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Tragedy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1886, at 4 (“Saturday evening some two hundred and fifty 
men rendezvoused in Sonoratown for the purpose of taking [alleged wife killer] Baynton out 
of jail and hanging him . . . .”).  
 219. See Michael Sturma, Policing the Frontier in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Australia, 
Britain, and America, in POLICING IN AUSTRALIA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 77, 
at 24. 
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percent got their count of conviction reduced to any lesser offense.220 My numbers 
showed a slightly greater willingness to convict men of intimate murder in 
Colorado than in New York, but a lesser likelihood that the death penalty would be 
imposed.221 I argued that condemnation of intimate-partner violence by men had 
spread to Colorado from the East Coast by the late nineteenth century, and indeed, 
that Coloradoans were especially concerned with projecting a woman-friendly 
image to attract respectable settler families.222 
My current research on intimate-partner homicide in other parts of the American 
West suggests a similar pattern. States and territories seeking to shed ruffian 
stereotypes officially began to embrace companionate marriage and manly self-
restraint in the second half of the nineteenth century, and as late as the 1920s, the 
distaste of California judges for the “caveman methods” of brutal husbands and 
lovers still echoed the values of Victorian society.223 The press and courts in other 
Western states made similar connections between wife beating and barbarism.224 
Playing catch-up in the quest for respectability, the American West vigorously 
denounced violence against women, including its lethal forms, during the period 
this Article covers.  
The analysis presented here is not quantitative, but it nonetheless provides 
evidence that male defendants were readily convicted of murder in scenarios 
involving jealousy, suspected infidelity, and separation. In California in the 1880s, 
for example, the Williams and Baynton cases resulted in penalties of life 
imprisonment and death, respectively, despite each defendant’s suspicion that his 
victim-wife had committed adultery.225 Fred Aguilar received a life sentence for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 220. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 30, at 144 & tbl.3. The data in this earlier 
study included a variety of family killings, such as matricide, under the rubric of “intimate 
homicide,” though the majority involved married couples or other sexual intimates. See id. at 
107. The current Article deals only with married couples and other sexual intimates. Indeed, 
most of the cases discussed here involved husbands and wives. 
 221. Id. at 144, 156. 
 222. Id. at 163–64. 
 223. Save Our Women, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1923, at II4. 
 224. For example, an Oregon newspaper praised police judges for imposing the full 
penalty provided for wife beating, despite the legislature’s failure to deem this crime “a more 
heinous offense than ordinary assault and battery.” Editorial, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), 
Aug. 7, 1895, col. A, at 4. According to the editorial: “The assumption that we have outlived 
the age of barbarism and its rude penalties will not hold as long as bruised and beaten wives 
come into court asking for protection from the brawny fists and booted heels of their brutal 
husbands.” Id. 
 225. William Williams’s case was earlier discussed at supra notes 198–201 and 
accompanying text. For the Williams verdict and sentence, see Verdict Form (filed Nov. 16, 
1887), People v. Williams, No. CR 000084, Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cal., 
Los Angeles County Records Archive (copy on file with author); see also For Life: Williams 
the Wife Murderer Gets His Dose, supra note 209, at 8; Wicked Williams: The Wife 
Butcher’s Trial Well Under Way, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1887, at 1.  
  Albert Baynton pleaded guilty to murdering both his wife and an elderly neighbor 
who tried to protect her. See Triple Murder, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1886, at 4; Twice Guilty, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1886, at 4. For a report that he received a death sentence, see November 
12: Then A.G. Baynton Will Expiate His Crimes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1886, at 6. The reliable 
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first-degree murder in 1909 after he whipped his spouse to death for her alleged 
unfaithfulness.226 Such outcomes were possible because the provocation doctrine 
required “serious and highly-provoking injury” to the defendant,227 and for much of 
the period covered by this Article, California courts held that neither mere words 
nor suspicion of infidelity sufficed.228  
A woman’s more general refusal to play a proper feminine role did not justify 
homicide under American law either. Men who claimed that they killed their wives 
for failing to cook dinner properly or meet other standards of housewifery got stern 
penalties.229 Moreover, judges consistently refused to give manslaughter 
instructions in cases in which too much time elapsed between the victim’s 
triggering misconduct and the defendant’s act of homicide.230 The rationale behind 
                                                                                                                 
death penalty data gathered by M. Watt Espy and John Ortiz Smykla confirm the execution 
in 1886, though Epsy and Smykla recorded the name as “Albert Boynton,” rather than Albert 
Baynton. Executions in the United States, 1609–2002: The Espy File, DEATH PENALTY 
INFORMATION CENTER, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-us-1608-
2002-espy-file [hereinafter Executions in the United States].  
  Until 1874, the automatic penalty for murder in California was death. 1850 Cal. Stat. 
231. Criminal code amendments in 1874 added “confinement in the state prison for life” as 
an alternative to the death penalty at the discretion of the jury (or of the trial judge in case of 
a guilty plea). An Act to Amend Section One Hundred and Ninety of the Penal Code, ch. 
508, 20th Sess. (Cal. 1874) (collected in Index to the Laws of California: 1850–1893, at 457 
(A.J. Johnston ed.)). Hence, the fact that Baynton pleaded guilty to murder did not 
automatically mean he would receive capital punishment. As the Times noted, the court 
could hear evidence and “is not forced to impose sentence of death—though the undoubtedly 
universal expectation and desire is that it will.” Untitled, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1886, at 1. 
 226. San Quentin Prison Register (Fred Aguilar, SQ # 23945), California State Archives, 
Office of the Secretary of State, Sacramento, CA (recording Aguilar’s life sentence for first-
degree murder) (copy on file with author); see Guilty of Wife Murder, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 
1909, at 15. 
 227. People v. Mendenhall, 67 P. 325, 326 (Cal. 1902). 
 228. See People v. Arnold, 48 P. 803, 803–04 (Cal. 1897) (“While ‘the sight of adultery 
committed by his wife’ may be . . . provocation to the husband which will justify that ‘heat 
of passion’ which is sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter, the knowledge of such fact 
must be based upon something more tangible than mere surmise, and the knowledge must be 
so recent as to preclude the idea of cooling time or premeditation.”); People v. Turley, 50 
Cal. 469, 470 (1875) (affirming the denial of a heat-of-passion instruction for a defendant 
who claimed to have been provoked by “words of reproach only”); see also CHARLES H. 
FAIRALL, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE OF CALIFORNIA INCLUDING THE PENAL CODE OF 
CALIFORNIA 276 (1906) (stating that “[w]ords of reproach, however grevious [sic],” did not 
constitute sufficient provocation in California). 
 229. See Forty-Five Years in Prison, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Apr. 14, 1876, at 
col. C (defendant got a forty-five year sentence for second-degree murder for kicking his 
wife to death when she burned his fish dinner); see also Ghost Story’s Climax Today, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 23, 1917, at II1 (immigrant defendant pleaded guilty to murder and was life-
sentenced for killing his flirtatious wife because she failed “to act as a German hausfrau”); 
On Trial for Wife Murder, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), June 24, 1880, col. I, at 3 
(defendant Edward Williams tried for murdering his spouse, who refused to quit her life of 
prostitution); Criminal Business—Superior Court, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), June 
28, 1880, col. F, at 3 (reporting Williams’s murder conviction). 
 230. See, e.g., People v. Ashland, 128 P. 798, 801–03 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1912) 
(affirming the denial of a manslaughter instruction for a homicide committed seventeen 
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such a restriction was that the passage of time converted sudden rage or fear to 
deliberate revenge.231 
Although my prior research showed that capital punishment in intimate-partner 
murder cases constituted a much lower percentage of total executions in Colorado 
than in New York,232 western states continued to execute some wife killers into the 
twentieth century. Such prisoners included men who cited sexual betrayal as the 
reason for their murderous rage. For instance, Jeremiah Allen went to the gallows 
at San Quentin in 1914 for the Christmas Eve slaying of his wife, whom he 
suspected of having a lover and engaging in prostitution.233 “[J]ealous of a 
paramour who had taken her back to the old life [of shame], he hunted her out . . . 
and killed her,” the Los Angeles Times reported.234 Despite telling a story that 
might lead to manslaughter mitigation today, he “paid with his life” for using lethal 
violence to prevent his spouse from leaving him.235  
Perhaps because the provocation doctrine had narrower bounds in the late 1800s 
and early 1900s than it does in the twenty-first century,236 men who killed their 
wives or girlfriends relied primarily on the insanity defense.237 Yet the murder 
conviction of male defendants who pleaded insanity was a common occurrence in 
the American West, even when infidelity, separation, or other displays of female 
autonomy were also alleged.238 California courts applied the cognitive M’Naughten 
                                                                                                                 
hours after the defendant learned the deceased had raped or seduced his wife); People v. 
Smith, 26 Cal. 665, 667–68 (1864) (holding that the six-hour time lapse between the 
defendant’s stabbing of the deceased and a previous fight between them precluded a 
provocation claim as a matter of law). 
 231. Smith, 26 Cal. at 668. 
 232. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 30, at 156 & tbls.4–5.  
 233. People v. Allen, 166 Cal. 723, 724–25 (1913); Executions in the United States, 
supra note 225 (recording the execution of “Jerry Allen” in 1914). 
 234. Wife Murderer Hanged, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1914, at II9. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 30, at 146–47, 151; Ramsey, Provoking 
Change, supra note 43, at 42–51, 54–57. There were, of course, exceptions to the rule that 
only men who killed immediately upon witnessing a wife’s adultery, or whose cases fit into 
another traditional provocation category, could obtain manslaughter mitigation. In 1877, for 
instance, a California jury found Civil War veteran John Velbert guilty of manslaughter, not 
murder, for killing his wife, whose suspected infidelities obsessed him over time. Sentencing 
Velbert to a mere two years in state prison, the judge explained that “the case was a very 
unfortunate one, and one which appealed to the sympathy, particularly of the Court” and that 
the “circumstances which excited the prisoner were of such a character that perhaps few men 
could resist.” Velbert’s Sentence, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Dec. 3, 1877, at col. E; 
see Velbert’s Trial for Murder, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Oct. 25, 1877, at col. C 
(describing how his wife’s alleged unfaithfulness “preyed upon him to such an extent that his 
acquaintances thought him crazy”).  
 237. See, e.g., infra notes 241–49 and accompanying text (discussing the Calzada case) 
and note 250 (mentioning other men who were convicted of murdering their wives, despite 
pleading insanity). Of course, claiming insanity carried the possibility of acquittal, whereas a 
successful provocation theory led only to manslaughter mitigation. It is thus possible that 
defense lawyers simply concentrated on the theory most likely to keep their clients out of 
prison. 
 238. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 30, at 154 (discussing unsuccessful defenses 
based on insanity, epilepsy, and incompetence to stand trial in late nineteenth- and early 
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test for legal insanity and would not excuse a criminal defendant from 
responsibility based on volitional impairment; indeed, impulsive men who lacked 
the willpower to avoid criminal behavior were deemed the most in need of restraint 
through fear of punishment.239  
California judges viewed the insanity defense with distrust,240 and juries seem to 
have done the same. After deliberating for only twenty minutes, for instance, a 
California jury found Francisco Calzada guilty of first-degree murder in 1888, 
despite his defense of insanity and epileptic mania.241 The facts of the case were 
those of a separation killing. The defendant fatally shot his wife after she left the 
abusive marriage, refused to give him custody of their children, and began a new 
relationship with another man.242 Calzada was sentenced to a life term in Folsom 
State Prison.243 While the judge gave the defendant some hope of commutation, he 
also criticized his cowardice and noted the strict cooling-time limit on the 
provocation doctrine, which precluded Calzada from obtaining manslaughter 
mitigation as an alternative to his insanity defense: 
[I]f you were determined to proceed to desperate measures—I say, if 
you could see no other way of saving your children—more courage 
would have been displayed in killing the despoiler of your home and 
the virtue of your wife. The taking the life of a woman is cowardly, and 
when a man appeals to that higher law—and in so doing runs the risk of 
the gallows—it would be more in keeping to carry his deadly purpose 
into effect when the offense is first committed . . . .244 
The judge alluded here to the “unwritten law” that historically justified a man’s 
killing of his wife’s paramour245 and distinguished such a killing from wife murder, 
which nineteenth-century society condemned, except in the narrow circumstances 
designated for heat-of-passion mitigation. Although the bench also cast the female 
victim as a wrongdoer, neighbors and journalists were more sympathetic to her. 
                                                                                                                 
twentieth-century Colorado). 
 239. FAIRALL, supra note 228, at 41–42. The M’Naughten test provided that legal 
insanity 
must be such that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was 
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of mind, as not to know 
the nature or quality of the act, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was 
doing what was wrong.  
Id. at 38. 
 240. Id. at 37–38. 
 241. See Verdict Form (filed Mar. 31, 1888), People v. Calzada, No. CR 000081, 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cal., Los Angeles County Records Archive (copy on 
file with author); Calzada Convicted, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1888, at 8. 
 242. The Wife Murderer: Francisco Calzada, Who Shot His Wife Full of Lead, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 28, 1888, at 2. 
 243. See Verdict Form (filed Mar. 31, 1888), People v. Calzada, supra note 241. 
 244. For Life: Murderer Calzada Goes to Folsom for His Natural Life, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
5, 1888, at 8. 
 245. HARTOG, supra note 17, at 218–41; PETTEGREW, supra note 3, at 297–304; see also 
infra notes 401–33 and accompanying text (discussing the decline of the “unwritten law” for 
men and the continued existence of a corollary doctrine sparing wronged women who killed 
their abusers). 
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Newspaper articles on the case reported that Calzada paid no attention to his 
estranged family “except when he came to pick a quarrel with his wife” and that he 
committed a premeditated revenge killing after inflicting years of abuse.246  
Press coverage of the Calzada case featured racist images of the Mexican 
defendant as stereotypically passionate and ferocious, yet calculating in his 
retaliation.247 Negative clichés about foreign men’s animalistic behavior also 
suffused the trials of defendants of color in Australia, and at least one scholar has 
suggested that Australian juries declined to recommend mercy for dark-skinned 
males.248 My sparse findings on race and ethnicity preclude ruling out anti-Hispanic 
discrimination as a factor in the Calzada case. However, the insanity claim and the 
guilty verdict in Calzada were also typical of intimate-partner homicides involving 
non-Hispanic male defendants during the same time period.249 Conversely, some 
Hispanics and Indians obtained manslaughter mitigation in the American West, and 
some aboriginal males escaped murder convictions in Australia.250  
                                                                                                                 
 
 246. The Wife Murderer: Francisco Calzada, Who Shot His Wife Full of Lead, supra note 
242, at 2. 
 247. According to the Los Angeles Times: 
Both the murderer and his victim were of the Spanish race, and with the 
passionate intensity of feeling seemingly characteristic of that southern land, 
the murderer not only carried his fell purpose into effect with ferocity, but 
afterward, by the confession of having previously planned the murderous 
assault, gloried in his [infamy].  
Id. 
 248. See Strange, supra note 45, at 316, 328. However, at least one case that Strange 
discusses—that of Asian defendant Daniel Ligores—appears to have resulted in a 
recommendation of mercy from the jury. Coversheet, Rex v. Ligores, Clerk of the Peace, 
Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7251 (1920, Central), 
SRNSW (copy on file with author) (noting the mercy rider). For more on the Ligores case, 
see infra note 293. 
 249. For example, in 1879, George Messersmith (a.k.a. George M. Smith) received a 
death sentence for murdering his estranged wife when she refused to reunite with him. 
Messersmith Sentenced to Be Hanged, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), May 30, 1879, at 
col. D; see also On Trial for Wife Murder, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F., Cal.), Apr. 22, 1879, 
at col. D (recounting the circumstances of the murder). But cf. Executions in the United 
States, supra note 225 (indicating, by omission, that Messersmith was not actually executed). 
Although Messersmith raised an insanity defense, the jury apparently felt no mercy for him, 
perhaps because it credited testimony he was neglectful, cruel, and physically abusive 
toward the victim. Messersmith Sentenced to Be Hanged, supra. Fifteen years later, insanity 
defenses proved similarly unavailing to California men charged with using lethal violence to 
prevent their wives from leaving. A jury rapidly rejected Thomas Gardner’s insanity defense 
to murder in 1916, for instance. The trial judge excluded much of the psychiatric testimony 
offered by both sides, and jurors apparently believed the prosecutor’s characterization of the 
crime as “ruthless and coldblooded.” Son Is Guilty; Mother Faints, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 
1916, at II2.  
  For a discussion of the limits of the insanity defense in sparing male murder 
defendants in Australia, see infra notes 252–56, 292 and accompanying text. 
 250. See, e.g., Untitled, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1885, at 1 (reporting that the jury 
compromised with a manslaughter verdict for a Hispanic male murder defendant, Loreto 
Robles, who claimed insanity); Law Report: Supreme Court: The Queen v. Jemmy (One of 
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b. Australian Cases 
From the mid-1800s through the early 1900s, Australian males faced the 
prospect of a substantial prison sentence or even the death penalty for murdering 
women who tried to leave them. Indeed, because statutory law mandated capital 
punishment for murder, those convicted had to rely on the mercy of governor.251 
Many of these prisoners raised unsuccessful insanity defenses at trial. Australian 
courts, like those in California, strictly applied the M’Naughten standard and 
tended to judge wife killers with mental problems harshly.252 For instance, 
Demetrius Morfessie was convicted of killing his allegedly unfaithful wife Bridget 
with an axe.253  He was initially found incompetent to plead but was subsequently 
tried and convicted of capital murder in 1915, despite his claim to have been insane 
at the time of the offense.254 Although his commuted sentence of ten years with 
hard labor paled by comparison to the life terms that many other Australian wife 
killers served,255 the capital case file reveals a great deal of contempt for him. 
                                                                                                                 
the Aborigines), ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Sept. 7, 1860, at 5 (noting that an aboriginal 
defendant charged with murdering an aboriginal woman, “his lubra,” had been found guilty 
of manslaughter and sentenced to only one year in prison in Victoria).  
  Courts in both regions expressed doubts about their jurisdiction over native peoples, 
and the legal standards applicable to them, which may have affected the relatively lenient 
outcomes for some indigenous defendants. See CASTLES, supra note 78, at 526–32 
(discussing the slow acceptance in Australia of the view that aborigines were subject to 
British law); Coll-Peter Thrush & Robert H. Keller, Jr., “I See What I Have Done”: The Life 
and Murder Trial of Xwelas, a S’Klallam Woman, in WRITING THE RANGE: RACE, CLASS, 
AND CULTURE IN THE WOMEN’S WEST 172, 183 (Elizabeth Jameson & Susan Armitage eds., 
1997) (speculating that confusion over the legal standards applicable to Native Americans in 
the Washington Territory in the 1870s may have led to manslaughter mitigation for an 
indigenous woman charged with murdering her white husband).  
 251. See GURNER, supra note 78, at 171 (“[I]n cases of murder, it is the judge’s duty to 
pass sentence of death upon the accused . . . .” (citing 27 Vict., No. 233, § 315)); PLUNKETT 
& WILKINSON (1860), supra note 69, at 28 (citing 1 Vic., c. 85, s. 2) (noting the mandatory 
death penalty for murder in New South Wales); WILKINSON ET AL. (1903), supra note 78, at 
177 (citing Crimes Act, No. 40, 1900, s. 19) (same); WILKINSON ET AL. (1894), supra note 
79, at 145 (citing 46 Vic., No. 17, s. 9) (same).  
 252. GURNER, supra note 78, at 118–21 (discussing the applicability to the colony of 
Victoria of the M’Naughten insanity standard, which required the jury to find that the 
defendant did not know the nature and quality of his act or its wrongfulness at the time of the 
crime); WOODS, supra note 14, at 162 (noting that no diminished responsibility defense was 
available in New South Wales until 1974). 
 253. See generally Victoria Capital Case Files, Unit 29 (Morfessie, 1915), VPRS 264/P0, 
PROV (copy on file with author) (providing details of Morfessie’s conviction for murder).  
 254. Solicitor-General’s Memorandum, Rex v. Morfessie, Capital Case Files, Unit 29 
(Morfessie, 1915), VPRS 264/P0, PROV (explaining why the trial was delayed until 1915); 
Register of Decisions on Capital Sentences, 1889–1944, VPRS 7583/P0001/2, PROV 
(recording commutation of Morfessie’s death sentence).  
 255. See Solictor-General’s Memorandum, Rex. v. Morfessie, supra note 254 (copy on 
file with author) (noting Morfessie’s commuted sentence), and supra notes 202–07 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Solomon case). 
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According to a police report, Morfessie was a “coward” whose poor family went 
about in rags and whose wife repeatedly sought to leave him.256  
Australian men who habitually beat their spouses before murdering them tended 
to get particularly stern treatment, even if their victims were not irreproachable by 
nineteenth-century standards. For example, a miner named John McDonald was 
executed in Victoria in 1860 for fatally assaulting his wife with a knife and an iron 
bar.257 The criminal case file indicates that he routinely beat his wife and that their 
quarrels were a daily occurrence.258 McDonald blamed alcohol for his crime, 
claiming he suffered delirium tremens.259 His victim also drank heavily, and she 
had been “before the bench for drunkenness” immediately prior to her death.260 
McDonald was nevertheless convicted of murder.261 Although the jury 
recommended mercy,262 he became one of the few intimate murderers actually 
hanged for his crime after the end of the convict era.263 McDonald pretended he 
came to Australia as a free man, but he had in fact spent sixteen years as a convict 
in Van Diemen’s Land.264 Despite his efforts to hide his convict origins, he 
received capital punishment for failing to live up to the respectable family ideal that 
had begun to be advocated in Australia by mid-century. 
2. Avenues to Mercy 
I shall argue that Australian juries and legal authorities exhibited greater 
empathy for men charged with killing under circumstances of separation or wifely 
insubordination than did their American counterparts. Yet, in both Australia and the 
United States, a male defendant’s case often resulted in a dismissal, acquittal, or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 256. Report of A.E. Hesford, Kilmore Station, Bourke Police District, Nov. 11, 1915, 
Victoria Capital Case Files, Unit 29 (Morfessie, 1915), VPRS 264/P0, PROV (copy on file 
with author). 
 257. Register of Decisions on Capital Sentences, 1851–1889, VPRS 7583/P0001/1, 
PROV (recording McDonald’s execution); see also Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), 
Sept. 4, 1860, at 4 (“The man McDonald, lately convicted of the murder of his wife, under 
circumstances of peculiar atrocity, at Ironbark Gully, Bendigo, was executed yesterday 
morning . . . .”); Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Aug. 4, 1860 at 5 (stating that 
McDonald, a former sailor, “had been digging at Ironbark”). 
 258. See Depositions of Alfred McDonald and James McDonald, Coroner’s Inquest, 
Queen v. McDonald, Case 3-347-26, Unit 137 (1860), Criminal Trial Briefs, VPRS 30/P/0, 
PROV (copy on file with author). 
 259. Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Sept. 4, 1860, at 4. 
 260. Barbarous Murder at Ironbark Gully, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Aug. 4, 1860, at 
7 (recounting the victim’s past arrest for drunkenness); see also Deposition of Alfred 
McDonald, Coroner’s Inquest, Queen v. McDonald, supra note 258 (stating that the victim 
had been released from the watch-house at Sandhurst the day before she was murdered). 
 261. See supra note 257, infra notes 262–63 (documenting McDonald’s murder 
conviction and execution). 
 262. See Coversheet, Queen v. McDonald, Case 3-347-26, Unit 137 (1860), Criminal 
Trial Briefs, VPRS 30/P/0, PROV (copy on file with author). 
 263. See infra notes 295–96 and accompanying text (discussing the relatively small 
percentage of intimate murderers who actually received capital punishment).  
 264. Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Sept. 4, 1860, at 4. 
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conviction for manslaughter (instead of murder) if it involved the supposedly 
inadvertent killing of a woman with a preexisting vulnerability. Prosecutors had 
difficulty proving the cause of death when the autopsy indicated that the beating 
merely exacerbated a medical condition caused by the victim’s disease or habitual 
drunkenness.265  
In Australia—where respectable men seem to have believed in the wife-beating 
prerogative longer than they did in the United States—the line between murder and 
accident was especially faint. Queen v. Price, a case from 1860, provides an 
illustration. Price involved an older woman in Victoria who became ill and 
partially paralyzed after her husband abused her.266 When she subsequently died, a 
criminal case ensued, and William Price was tried for manslaughter.267 The 
couple’s son testified, “my father was not in the habit of beating my mother, but 
when in drink he might give her [a] push.”268 Indeed, such a push from William 
allegedly caused “a[n] effusion of serum at the [b]ack of the brain” that killed Ann 
Price.269 The Crown Prosecutor conceded this type of manslaughter was “little 
removed from accidental homicide,” however, and said “the prisoner had his 
sympathy.”270 Witness testimony convinced him that the prisoner “had been 
uniformly kind and humane to his wife; and the law allowed husbands to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 265. See Is It Murder or Disease?, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1886, at 1 (reporting that, 
according to the coroner, Josefa Celier “[came] to her death from pneumonia superinduced 
by blows given her by her [de facto] husband [Emanuel Miranda]”); The Courts, L.A. TIMES, 
June 22, 1886, at 3 (noting that Emanuel Miranda was discharged). See generally Queen v. 
Robertson, Case 11, Unit 299 (1866), Criminal Trial Briefs, VPRS 30/P/0, PROV (copy on 
file with author) (recording a directed verdict of acquittal where the drunken victim died 
from a blow, but there was insufficient evidence of how she received it). The Robertson case 
“broke down through the principal witness, a girl named Mary Campbell, about seven years 
of age, not being considered by the Court a competent witness.” Wilful Murder, ARGUS 
(Melbourne, Austl.), Oct. 4, 1866, at 6. Robertson had been accused of murder, but in other 
cases, a dearth of evidence pinpointing the defendant’s violence as the cause of death 
prompted the government to charge manslaughter, instead of murder. See Coversheet, Queen 
v. Balmer, Case 12, Unit 254 (1862), Criminal Trial Briefs, VPRS 30/P/0, PROV (copy on 
file with author) (noting manslaughter charge); Deposition of Charles Mackin, surgeon, 
Queen v. Balmer, supra (opining that the victim’s death was “attributable to exhaustion 
consequent on mania accelerated by the injuries received [from beatings by the defendant]”); 
see also Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 30, at 114–16 (noting that the rare instances 
in which American prosecutors charged wife killers with manslaughter, instead of murder, 
typically involved beating victims who drank excessively or had other preexisting 
vulnerabilities). 
 266. Deposition of William Price, Jr., Coroner’s Inquest, Queen v. Price, Case 3-276-11, 
Unit 125 (1860), Criminal Trial Briefs, VPRS 30/P/0, PROV (copy on file with author). 
 267. See Manslaughter, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Feb. 6, 1860, at 7. 
 268. Deposition of William Price, Jr., Coroner’s Inquest, Queen v. Price, supra note 266. 
 269. Deposition of Dr. Eustace James Walshe, Coroner’s Inquest, Queen v. Price, Case 3-
276-11, Unit 125 (1860), Criminal Trial Briefs, VPRS 30/P/0, PROV (copy on file with 
author). 
 270. Manslaughter, supra note 267 (paraphrasing the prosecutor’s address to the jury). 
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administer corporal chastisement, to a certain degree, to their wives.”271 Price was 
acquitted by directed verdict.272 
The release of alleged wife murderers due to a failure of proof was 
controversial. The Argus newspaper said of another male defendant whom a jury 
acquitted of wife murder the same year as Price: 
It is evident that, if the prisoner did not actually murder the unfortunate 
woman, he, by his inhuman treatment, drove her mad, and occasioned 
her to commit suicide, by throwing herself down a well over 70 feet 
deep. Such a fellow, under any circumstances, deserves to be 
punished.273 
Some victims inspired less sympathy, however. Australian women who recalled 
the stereotype of the crude, drunken, promiscuous female convict274 might be 
deemed to have incited men to a homicidal frenzy. American courts and juries 
rarely found husbands eligible for manslaughter mitigation if they killed their wives 
for any misconduct short of adultery they had actually witnessed.275 Mitigation in 
Australia, by contrast, occasionally stemmed from the view that female 
insubordination or inconstancy provoked the attack. For example, in 1862, a jury 
found murder defendant Nathaniel Gardiner guilty of the lesser offense of 
manslaughter for killing his wife when she failed to cook his dinner.276 He received 
a paltry three-month sentence, reflecting not only the court’s acknowledgement of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 271. Id. A treatise published in New South Wales in the late nineteenth century stated 
that “where in a case of beating, by a master or teacher, for example, the circumstances show 
only an intent reasonably to chastise, or not materially to injure, the homicide would at most 
be manslaughter, and might be misadventure merely.” WILKINSON ET AL. (1894), supra note 
79, at 148 (further noting that if a woman died because a broomstick had been thrown at her, 
such a killing would be manslaughter, but if she were struck with an instrument likely to 
cause death, it would be murder). However, the discussion of lawful domestic correction 
elsewhere in the same treatise does not include wife beating among its examples of justified 
battery. See id. at 37. This omission dated back at least as far as 1860, suggesting that the 
right of moderate chastisement of wives had been abrogated or was at least contested at the 
time. See PLUNKETT & WILKINSON (1860), supra note 69, at 23. But cf. People v. Munn, 3 P. 
650, 651 (Cal. 1884) (citing Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458 (1871)) (indicating 
that, in some American states, the formal law was that a man who killed his wife 
accidentally during a beating was guilty only of manslaughter, even though the blows were 
illegal).  
 272. Coversheet, Queen v. Price, Case 3-276-11, Unit 125 (1860), Criminal Trial Briefs, 
VPRS 30/P/0, PROV (copy on file with author); see also Manslaughter, supra note 267 
(“His Honour directed the jury to acquit the prisoner, and he was discharged.”). 
 273. The Supposed Murder in the New Township, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), April 30, 
1860, at 5. For the neighbors’ efforts to shelter the abused woman prior to her death, see 
supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 274. HUGHES, supra note 14, at 244, 249.  
 275. See supra notes 225–36 and accompanying text.  
 276. See Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Dec. 18, 1862, at 5 (reporting Gardiner’s 
conviction and sentence). The couple’s son testified: “My mother was tipsy, and she had no 
dinner or anything. My mother then began ‘aggravating’ and ‘jawing’ [my father].” Wife 
Murder, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Dec. 19, 1862 at 7.  
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his remorse and his responsibility toward multiple children, but also its view that he 
had been pushed beyond self-control by an impudent, neglectful, and habitually 
drunk spouse.277 Drinking was not a sex-neutral activity; rather, working-class and 
middle-class men shared the view that a woman who drank or was drunk, 
especially in public, posed a challenge to her husband’s authority.278  
Increasing female independence—made possible by paid work, the extension of 
divorce law, and the reduction of family size—also threatened male prerogatives. 
Thus, in the wake of World War I, more than a half-century after the Gardiner 
case, an Australian woman’s failure to be nurturing and faithful still partially 
legitimized her husband’s homicidal violence in the eyes of some courts and juries. 
If the deceased had deserted a war veteran, her misconduct might seem especially 
disloyal.279 The case of Rex v. Collins provides an apt illustration. Harold Collins, 
“a returned solider . . . [who] was badly injured at the war,” fatally shot his wife 
Mollie in 1925.280 Mollie had been convicted of marrying Collins under bigamous 
circumstances; she maintained a separate residence and was going out with other 
men when Collins killed her.281 Though Collins faced a murder charge, the jury 
convicted him of manslaughter with a recommendation to mercy “on account of 
previous good character,” and he was sentenced to just three years of penal 
servitude.282  
Australian men who became enraged at their female partners’ violation of 
gender norms thus seem to have received more sympathy than their American 
counterparts. Male defendants who raised insanity claims also fared better in 
Australia. Indeed, my research unearthed Australian cases from the 1860s through 
the early twentieth century in which men were acquitted on grounds of insanity for 
killings arguably driven by sexual jealousy and a desire for control. For example, 
after Simon Houliahan served a jail term at Ballarat, Victoria, for an unspecified 
                                                                                                                 
 
 277. Untitled, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Dec. 18, 1862, at 5. Even if a judge allowed a 
provocation claim based on insubordination to go to the jury, he might still take a dim view 
of the defendant’s overreaction to female misconduct. Hence, a man in Victoria received a 
fifteen-year sentence—the maximum for manslaughter—for fatally striking his wife with a 
wooden plank when she insisted, against his wishes, on going to the store. The crime was 
neither justifiable nor excusable in the court’s eyes, but the court concurred with the jury that 
the defendant had not formed premeditated intent to kill. See Murder of a Wife, ARGUS 
(Melbourne, Austl.), Feb. 16, 1884, at 7; Central Criminal Court: Sentences, ARGUS 
(Melbourne, Austl.), Feb. 18, 1884, at 10. 
 278. Allen, ‘Mundane’ Men, supra note 48, at 623. 
 279. See ALLEN, SEX AND SECRETS, supra note 15, at 136–38 (arguing that the interwar 
period brought much sympathy and higher rates of manslaughter mitigation for veterans 
homicidally enraged by their wives’ infidelity or desire for divorce).  
 280. Memo of Police Sergeant J.J. Lynch, Rex v. Collins, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions 
and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7288 (1925, Central), SRNSW (copy 
on file with author) (noting the defendant’s veteran status). 
 281. See Depositions of Albert Arthur Lawrence and Doris Ida May Germyn, Coroner’s 
Inquest at 6–7, 12 Rex v. Collins, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme 
Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7288 (1925, Central), SRNSW (copy on file with author) 
(describing the victim’s alleged misconduct). 
 282. Clerk of the Peace, Register of Cases Heard in Central Criminal Court, 19/13210, at 
202, SRNSW (copy on file with author) (recording Collins case outcome). 
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offense, he imagined that his wife had taken a lover and that they were plotting to 
kill him.283 He began to carry a shearing blade attached to a stick, ostensibly for 
self-protection, and he eventually stabbed his wife in the abdomen with it.284 In 
1862, a jury found him not guilty of murder on grounds of insanity.285  
Such cases of acquittal or manslaughter mitigation for provoked or insane men 
constituted outliers, however. The more common route to mercy for male 
defendants lay in executive commutation.286 This was because both heat of passion 
and insanity were construed narrowly. Legally adequate provocation still required 
justified anger in the late 1800s and early 1900s, even though the defense was 
increasingly characterized as a partial excuse for loss of self-control.287 A judge 
was supposed to direct jurors that, as a matter of law, they could not reduce a 
murder charge to manslaughter if no evidence showed adequate provocation.288 
Cases falling into grey areas went to the jury, subject to judicial comments and 
advice.289 However, for the most part, Australian courts (like their American 
counterparts) gave the provocation doctrine a narrow interpretation and found few 
types of victim behavior that qualified. Even after juries in New South Wales were 
allowed by statute to hear provocation claims based on “grossly insulting language 
or gestures on the part of the deceased,” such behavior was deemed provoking only 
“in certain exceptional cases.”290 The law ordained that, when considering whether 
the defendant’s act was proportional to the alleged provocation, “a ferocious excess 
of violence, far beyond what the particular provocation called for . . . shall not be 
held justifiable, but shall be accounted murder.”291 The strict M’Naughten test for 
insanity further constrained defendants’ ability to escape a murder conviction.292 
Thus, contrary to the lenient outcomes in the Collins and Houliahan cases, men 
were often found guilty of murder in circumstances of suspected infidelity.293 
                                                                                                                 
 
 283. Depositions of Constable Alexander Dempster and Thomas Wegly, Queen v. 
Houliahan, Case 3, Unit 247 (1862), Criminal Trial Briefs, VPRS 30/P/0, PROV (copy on 
file with author).  
 284. Depositions of William Currie and Thomas Wegly, Queen v. Houliahan, Case 3, 
Unit 247 (1862), Criminal Trial Briefs, VPRS 30/P/0, PROV (copy on file with author).  
 285. See Coversheet, Queen v. Houliahan, Case 3, Unit 247 (1862), Criminal Trial 
Briefs, VPRS 30/P/0, PROV (copy on file with author). Early in the next century, Walter 
Lovett obtained an NGRI acquittal in New South Wales when he fatally shot his wife, who 
had separated from him and earned her own living. See Murder Charge Fails: Husband Not 
Guilty, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Sept. 10, 1910, at 19 (describing Lovett as “very 
jealous”). 
 286. See infra notes 295–96 (discussing executive commutation). 
 287. Ramsey, Provoking Change, supra note 43, at 49, 54–55. 
 288. See WILKINSON ET AL. (1903), supra note 78, at 182. 
 289. PLUNKETT & WILKINSON (1860), supra note 69, at 310. 
 290. WILKINSON ET AL. (1894), supra note 79, at 254–55 (citing 46 Vic., No. 17, s. 370). 
 291. PLUNKETT & WILKINSON (1860), supra note 69, at 310. 
 292. See supra note 252 (discussing the insanity standard in Victoria and New South 
Wales). 
 293. For instance, a New South Wales jury convicted Charles Jenkins of murder for 
shooting his estranged wife Jemima after he threatened her life and bragged to her that he 
could “get a woman as well as you [Jemima] can get a man.” Deposition of Mary Wilson, 
Coroner’s Inquest at 28, Rex v. Jenkins, supra note 156; see Coversheet, Rex v. Jenkins, 
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Prosecutors and judges in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
reminded such men that they had no right to use violence, instead of divorce, as a 
solution to cuckoldry.294 
When Australian juries convicted provoked, disturbed, or despondent men of 
murder, a mercy rider was often attached to the verdict, and the executive 
commuted the mandatory death sentence to life imprisonment.295 Outcomes of this 
type predominated in femicide cases in New South Wales and Victoria.296 Still, 
mercy at the punishment stage did not negate the expressive power of a murder 
conviction, nor did it preclude judges and journalists from making denunciatory 
statements to clarify that killing a woman was wrongful and that male anger, 
jealousy, or depression triggered by most types of female misconduct were 
insufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter.  
II. FEMALE DEFENDANTS AND JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 
As we have seen, courts and juries had some understanding of abused women’s 
limited options, and they viewed brutal husbands as wrongdoers.297 Hence, they 
showed sympathy for female murder defendants’ claims of self-defense and 
desertion. In Colorado in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for 
example, women had a greater likelihood of being acquitted of murder charges than 
being convicted of either murder or a lesser offense.298 Quantitative data from New 
South Wales in the late 1800s indicates a somewhat higher rate of conviction for 
Australian women. Nonetheless, only slightly fewer than half of all female murder 
defendants were acquitted in a Sydney suburb during the late nineteenth century,299 
                                                                                                                 
Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7204 
(1915, Bathurst), SRNSW (copy on file with author) (recording the verdict). In another case, 
an Asian defendant, Daniel Ligores, became homicidally obsessed with his wife’s 
involvement in a free love society. Although at least one trial witnesses thought Ligores was 
justified in being angry, the jury convicted him of murder. Deposition of Herbert Walter 
Teesdale Atkinson, Coroner’s Inquest at 16–19, Rex v. Ligores, Clerk of the Peace, 
Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7251 (1920, Central); 
see Coversheet, Rex v. Ligores, SRNSW, supra note 248 (recording the verdict).  
 294. See Strange, supra note 45, at 328–29. 
 295. See id. at 311–15. 
 296. In the period Strange studied (1880–1920), only six male defendants out of sixty-
four convicted of femicide or attempted femicide were actually executed. Id. at 316. Most 
men who killed their female intimates ultimately received life sentences. See id. at 315–16. 
For examples from nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Victoria, see e.g., Register of 
Decisions on Capital Sentences, 1851–1889 VPRS 7583/P0001/1, PROV (recording the 
commutation of the death sentence for William Smith in 1860 to life imprisonment with hard 
labor and three years in irons); Register of Decisions on Capital Sentences, 1889–1944, 
VPRS 7583/P0001/2, PROV (recording that Demetrius Morfessie’s capital sentence was 
commuted to ten years in prison with hard labor in 1915). Death sentences for Australian 
women were almost uniformly commuted to a prison term, as well. See, e.g., infra notes 366, 
395 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra Part I.B. 
 298. See Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 30, at 122–23 & tbl.2 (presenting data 
from Denver/Arapahoe County, Colorado). 
 299. ALLEN, SEX AND SECRETS, supra note 15, at 40–41 (presenting data from Newtown, 
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and women were practically never executed in either part of the world during the 
time period studied in this Article.300 Most importantly, female defendants charged 
with murdering their batterers could more successfully claim self-defense than the 
existing scholarship implies.301  
A. Insanity: The Presumed Defense for Women? 
Like modern scholars, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century observers often 
ascribed the acquittal of female defendants to the success of insanity claims or to a 
general reluctance to impose the death penalty on women. American newspapers 
reported prosecutorial frustration at voir dire arising from the unwillingness of 
prospective jurors to convict females of capital crimes.302 Similarly, the mandatory 
death penalty for murder in New South Wales was thought to produce jury 
nullification in women’s cases.303  
Nineteenth-century observers also blamed psychiatric testimony for the acquittal 
of female defendants who had allegedly committed cold-blooded, premeditated 
murders. For example, Melbourne’s Age newspaper opined that, in women’s cases, 
“[m]edical men are always arrogating to themselves the right to say what is and 
what is not madness; and yet the majority of them have made no special study of 
the complex issues involved in it.”304 Many historians have emphasized this 
conflation of female criminality and female lunacy,305 noting that nineteenth-
century medical discourse “figured female bodies as variously disordered, diseased 
and desiring” and that women were thought to exhibit a natural tendency toward 
                                                                                                                 
New South Wales). 
 300. See Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 30, at 131–32, 159 tbl.5; Strange, supra 
note 45, at 316 & tbl.1. 
 301. For example, an otherwise excellent chapter on the murder trial of an Indian woman 
for killing her white husband in the late nineteenth-century Washington Territory assumes 
that “[d]uring this period in the American West, no legal precedents existed that took into 
account as justification for homicide domestic violence against women.” Thrush & Keller, 
supra note 250, at 182. 
 302. See, e.g., Accused of Killing Husband, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1922, at II1 (“The day 
was spent in selecting the jury [for the murder trial of Julia Lee Johnstone], but as many of 
the panel balked on inflicting the death penalty on a woman, considerable time was taken 
up.”). Squeamishness about capital punishment for women in the American West resonated 
with the reluctance of prospective jurors in northeastern states like New York to sit in 
judgment on female murder defendants. See Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 30, at 
123. 
 303. See ALLEN, SEX AND SECRETS, supra note 15, at 113. 
 304. Editorial, AGE (Melbourne, Austl.), Sept. 9, 1899, at 8. 
 305. See Cathy Coleborn, Legislating Lunacy and the Female Lunatic Body in 
Nineteenth-Century Victoria, in SEX, POWER, AND JUSTICE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
LAW IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 34, at 86, 94; see also Ball, supra note 47, at 98 (contending 
that, since frontier women’s basic function was to give life, those instances in which they 
took it were attributed to circumstances, such as spousal abuse or desperate poverty, that 
drove them to insanity); Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered 
Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 994 (1995) (“The insanity 
defense was premised on the stereotypical belief that aggression and violence were unnatural 
in women.”). 
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hysteria.306 Yet, as I have shown above, male defendants relied on insanity theories, 
too, even in cases involving jealousy or alleged adultery. A key difference between 
men’s and women’s strategies was that women tended to obtain acquittals, whereas 
men were often convicted of murder despite raising an insanity defense.307 
While insanity claims may have been a common means of defeating murder 
charges against female defendants in the American West and Australia,308 the more 
remarkable finding is that justifiable homicide arguments also spared women who 
killed their batterers from conviction in both regions. Indeed, during the period 
covered by this Article, some women who killed male intimate partners could 
obtain acquittals without any mention of insanity at all. This was especially likely 
to occur if a brutal husband had attacked or threatened his wife in close proximity 
to being killed by her. 
B. Confrontational Killings as Self-Defense 
Caroline Augusta Buckman fatally shot her abusive husband James on a ranch 
near Narrabri, New South Wales, on January 20, 1910.309 The police arrested her 
when she turned herself in and surrendered a five-chambered revolver.310 The 
district coroner committed her for trial in the Armidale Circuit Court,311 and after 
being denied bail, Caroline entered a plea of not guilty.312 According to the 
couple’s daughter Gertie, Caroline had a “regular dog’s life” with her husband.313 
                                                                                                                 
 
 306. Coleborn, supra note 305, at 93; see also, e.g., CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, The 
Hysterical Woman: Sex Roles and Role Conflict in Nineteenth-Century America, in 
DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 197, 215 (1985) 
(discussing parallels between symptoms of hysteria and aspects of middle-class women’s 
role in the nineteenth century). 
 307. See supra text accompanying notes 238–49, 252–56, 292. A manslaughter 
“compromise” in which the jury returned a lesser-included offense conviction constituted a 
third but less typical outcome for both men and women who pleaded insanity. See supra note 
250 (noting a “manslaughter compromise” in the case of Hispanic murder defendant, Loreto 
Robles, Jr.). For a comparable result when a woman stood trial, see Wife Found Guilty of 
Killing Rancher, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 1923, at 13. 
 308. See, e.g., NSW Police Gazette, NRS 10958, Reel 3606, at 325, SRNSW (copy on 
file with author) (reporting that husband killer Sarah McDonald was committed to an asylum 
in New South Wales after being declared insane); The Pacific Slope: Verdict, Jury Acquits 
Mrs. Drown, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1914, at II9 (reporting that defendant Millie Drown was 
acquitted on insanity grounds, despite the prosecutor’s theory that she killed her husband for 
his life insurance). 
 309.  See NSW Police Gazette, NRS 10958, 1/3245, Reel 3597, at 61, SRNSW (copy on 
file with author).  
 310. Deposition of Patrick Scannell, Sergeant of Police, Coroner’s Inquest at 4, Rex v. 
Buckman, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit 
Courts, 9/7157 (1910, Armidale), SRNSW (copy on file with author). 
 311. NSW Police Gazette, supra note 309, at 61 (copy on file with author). 
 312. See id.; Coversheet, Rex v. Buckman, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of 
the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7157 (1910, Armidale), SRNSW (copy on file with 
author). 
 313. Deposition of Mary Gertrude Buckman, Coroner’s Inquest at 30, Rex v. Buckman, 
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The deceased routinely beat her and their children; forced her to live in an old cart 
shed, instead of in the house with him; and brought another woman to his residence 
for sexual purposes.314 In the decade prior to the killings, Caroline charged the 
deceased in police court with inflicting grievous bodily harm, and she also 
instigated lunacy proceedings against him when he mistreated one of their 
daughters.315 She ultimately withdrew the assault charge and refused to testify in 
the latter case because “the wheat was falling off and there was no one to [harvest 
it].”316  
The court before which James Buckman was summoned on the 1901 assault 
charge ordered him to sign an agreement to treat his wife and children “kindly and 
provide them with food[,] clothing[,] and necessaries” and also to pay attorney’s 
fees.317 But the violence did not stop. Acquaintances recalled that on various 
occasions James struck his wife with an axe handle and a switch, bit her hand, and 
forced her “under the bed to avoid the beating.”318 Caroline’s children and several 
neighbors took her part in the 1909 lunacy case. Jesse McMahon stated, for 
example, that she “did not think that the deceased was a safe man to be left in a 
lonely place with wife and children.”319 George Bates testified in these same 
proceedings because he feared the deceased would murder Caroline, whom he 
considered to be a “straightforward hard working woman.”320 Despite evidence of 
James Buckman’s instability, the court discharged him.321 The couple separated, 
and the wife worked at a dairy farm for almost a year to escape the husband’s 
                                                                                                                 
Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7157 
(1910, Armidale), SRNSW (copy on file with author). 
 314. See id. at 30–31. 
 315. See id.; see also Exhibits on Assault Case (Nov. 6, 1901) and Lunacy Proceedings 
(July 24, 1909), Rex v. Buckman, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the 
Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7157 (1910, Armidale), SRNSW (copy on file with 
author). 
 316. Deposition of Mary Gertrude Buckman, Coroner’s Inquest at 32, Rex v. Buckman, 
supra note 313. 
 317. Exhibits on Assault Case (Nov. 6, 1901), Rex v. Buckman, supra note 315. 
However, the judge also required the couple to enter into a mutual agreement to keep the 
peace toward each other, which indicates that courts sometimes ignored conditions of 
dominance in favor of treating men and women as equally at fault. Id.  
 318. Deposition of William Renard, Coroner’s Inquest at 64, Rex v. Buckman, Clerk of 
the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7157 (1910, 
Armidale), SRNSW (copy on file with author); see Deposition of George Bates, Coroner’s 
Inquest at 62–63, Rex v. Buckman, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the 
Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7157 (1910, Armidale), SRNSW (copy on file with 
author); Deposition of Jessie McMahon, Coroner’s Inquest at 61, Rex v. Buckman, Clerk of 
the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7157 (1910, 
Armidale), SRNSW (copy on file with author). 
 319. Deposition of Jessie McMahon, Coroner’s Inquest at 61, Rex v. Buckman, supra 
note 318. 
 320. Deposition of George Bates, Coroner’s Inquest at 62–63, Rex v. Buckman, supra 
note 318. 
 321. See Exhibit on Lunacy Proceedings, Rex v. Buckman, supra note 315. 
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unprovoked violence.322 However, by 1910 she was back at the Mile and Tile 
Station near Narrabri.323 
On the afternoon of the fatal shooting, Caroline argued with her husband about a 
horse and also about her tardiness in preparing dinner.324 Thereafter, she cantered 
toward town on a route she selected to avoid meeting the deceased; yet, despite this 
precaution, James came after her “as hard as he could gallop” with a “mad wild 
look in his face.”325 Caroline tried to race to a nearby rabbiter’s camp but ran into a 
tree branch and fell off her horse. The deceased’s steed jumped over her, stepping 
on her hand.326 According to Caroline, the deceased then dismounted and grabbed a 
“great big stick.”327 He left when she begged him not to hit her but later returned, 
announcing that he had come back with the intention of murdering her.328 When 
James raised the stick over his head and brought it down with all his might, his wife 
drew a revolver and shot him in the chest. Caroline characterized her actions as 
self-defensive and further stated that she did not take exact aim.329 
Despite this sympathetic story, some evidence pointed to a premeditated murder. 
Several deponents testified that Caroline Buckman carried a pistol and made death 
threats against her husband prior to the shooting, and the couple’s younger daughter 
said Caroline had a violent temper.330 Furthermore, the physician who performed 
the postmortem exam on the deceased’s body thought it possible that the accused 
had fired the shot while she was on horseback, rather than lying injured on the 
ground. He believed the firearm was at some distance from the deceased because he 
                                                                                                                 
 
 322. See Deposition of Caroline Augusta Buckman, Coroner’s Inquest at 55, Rex v. 
Buckman, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit 
Courts, 9/7157 (1910, Armidale), SRNSW (copy on file with author). According to a 
relative, Mr. Buckman paid his estranged wife some money for her support during this time. 
See Deposition of Robert Thomas Buckman, Coroner’s Inquest at 19, Rex v. Buckman, 
Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7157 
(1910, Armidale), SRNSW (copy on file with author). 
 323. See Deposition of Caroline Augusta Buckman, Coroner’s Inquest at 44, Rex v. 
Buckman, supra note 322 (indicating that she resided at Mile and Tile at the time of the 
killing in 1910). 
 324. See id. at 47–48. 
 325. Id. at 49. 
 326. See id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 49–50. 
 329. Id. at 50; see also Deposition of Simon Butler, Sub-Inspector of Police, Coroner’s 
Inquest at 6, Rex v. Buckman, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme 
Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7157 (1910, Armidale), SRNSW (copy on file with author) 
(confirming the nature of deceased’s wound). 
 330. See Depositions of Robert Thomas Buckman, Amy Ethel Buckman, and Ella 
Keegan, Coroner’s Inquest at 15, 27, 40–41, Rex v. Buckman, Clerk of the Peace, 
Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7157 (1910, Armidale), 
SRNSW (copy on file with author). But see Deposition of Mary Gertrude Buckman, 
Coroner’s Inquest at 65, Rex v. Buckman, supra note 313 (denying that defendant showed 
her boss’s daughter, Ella Keegan, a revolver and that defendant told either Ella or her that 
she would shoot Mr. Buckman). 
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did not observe any scorching of the deceased’s shirt.331 Nevertheless, while the 
evidence did not all favor Caroline Buckman, the trial jury ultimately acquitted 
her.332 The jurors seem to have formed the same opinion as the Buckmans’ 
neighbors, who considered James dangerous and thought “it was not to his credit to 
belt his wife.”333 Newspaper reporters described the tragedy as “a wife’s fight for 
life”334 and a “justifiable homicide.”335 
Two things are notable about Caroline Buckman’s case and the others like it that 
resulted in acquittals. First, the facts (if construed according to the defendant’s 
story) showed a confrontational situation in which the deceased posed a lethal 
threat to the accused. Second, the defendant’s account was rendered credible 
because the jury was allowed to consider the context in which the killing 
occurred—an abusive marriage that the defendant tried to escape or make safer by 
appealing to neighbors, the police, or the courts. 
The case of Bridget Waters, a California woman acquitted of murdering her 
husband in 1888,336 provides another example of jury sympathy for a woman who 
ran out of nonviolent options. For Bridget, separation provided no safe haven. Her 
husband “not only beat and abused her, but [also] . . . followed her from place to 
place, and forced her to give him money whenever she had it.”337 When Bridget 
resided in Los Angeles, she learned that her husband Patrick had come to town and 
pleaded with an officer to arrest him. The policeman responded by going in search 
of Patrick;338 yet, Patrick still showed up at Bridget’s door and assaulted her.339 He 
                                                                                                                 
 
 331. Deposition of Alexander John Park, Coroner’s Inquest at 22–23, Rex v. Buckman, 
Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7157 
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 332. Supreme Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Register of Criminal Indictments (1907–
1919), 9/2635, Reel 1861 at 88, SRNSW (copy on file with author); Coversheet, Rex v. 
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 333. Deposition of George Bates, Coroner’s Inquest at 62, Rex v. Buckman, supra note 
318.  
 334. The Narrabri Tragedy: Inquest on the Victim, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Feb. 4, 
1910, at 7. 
 335. Justifiable Homicide: Wife Shoots Husband, ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Apr. 29, 
1910, at 6. 
 336. Verdict Form (filed June 6, 1888), People v. Waters, No. CR 000274, Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County, Cal., Los Angeles County Records Archive (copy on file with 
author). 
 337. The Waters Case: Mrs. Waters Wants Her Husband Out of the Way, L.A. TIMES, 
May 3, 1888, at 2. The Times further reported: “No less than eight times has he attempted to 
take her life in their two years of married life, and the constant dread upon her decided her to 
leave him.” Mrs. Waters: Takes a Shot at Her Fighting Hubby, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1888, at 
2. 
 338. See Deposition of Officer H.W. Marden, Coroner’s Inquisition, People v. Waters, 
No. CR 00274, Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cal., Los Angeles County Records 
Archive (copy on file with author); The Waters Case: Mrs. Waters Wants Her Husband Out 
of the Way, supra note 337, at 2. 
 339. See Deposition of Daniel G. Fallon, Coroner’s Inquisition, People v. Waters, No. 
CR 00274, Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cal., Los Angeles County Records 
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was ejected by two men, but she encountered him again when she went to the 
store.340 Bridget took the witness stand in her own defense and claimed her husband 
tried to shoot her, as he had done at least twice in the past.341 Several residents of 
her boarding house corroborated her story,342 and the jury acquitted her. 
The press depicted Bridget Waters as an unattractive, older woman who used 
foul language and interjected inappropriate remarks from the witness stand,343 so 
her acquittal could not have arisen from romantic notions about her. Rather, “[a] 
mass of testimony . . . tending to show that Waters had repeatedly threatened his 
wife”344 provided a sympathetic context for the determination that she acted in self-
defense. Evidence of the deceased’s past acts of violence was admissible because 
Bridget claimed he menaced her with a gun immediately before the shooting.345 
Patrick’s prior abuse gave her reasonable grounds to fear him;346 hence, her 
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fond of interchanging complimentary language more vigorous than polite.”); The Husband 
Killer: Mrs. Waters Tells Why She Killed Her Husband, supra note 340, at 3 (“She proved a 
most valuable, and not altogether a satisfactory witness, interpolating remarks uncalled for 
by counsel, and damaging, rather than benefitting, her case.”). 
 344. The Husband Killer: Mrs. Waters Tells Why She Killed Her Husband, supra note 
340, at 3. 
 345. See People v. Edwards, 41 Cal. 640, 643–44 (1871) (stating that the violent 
character of the deceased is admissible to show that the defendant had reasonable grounds to 
fear death or bodily harm if some fact transpired at the time of the killing indicating the 
“immediate purpose of the deceased toward the prisoner to be hostile, or at least equivocal, 
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 346. The trial court instructed the jurors that if Mrs. Waters “did not have reasonable 
grounds to believe that she was then in danger of receiving some serious harm or injury at 
the hands of her husband they should not acquit the defendant.” Instructions Asked by 
People and Given (filed June 4, 1888), People v. Waters, No. CR000274, Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County, Cal., Los Angeles County Records Archive (copy on file with author). 
A spirit of revenge arising from previous assaults on her by the deceased did not justify the 
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attorney had no need to depict her as insane. Based on testimony that the deceased 
had previously shot at Bridget,347 the jury apparently believed he had attempted to 
do so again in the moments before she killed him. Under California law she had no 
duty to retreat,348 and in any event, the Waters jury seems to have recognized that 
neither leaving one’s spouse nor calling the police was always an effective solution. 
Like the Buckman case in Australia, Bridget Waters’s trial included allegations 
that the accused had issued death threats of her own.349 But in both the Waters and 
Buckman cases, the verdict endorsed a self-defense theory, rather than the 
prosecution’s charge of premeditated murder, and the homicide also generated 
publicity favorable to the defendant. The Los Angeles Times opined, for example, 
that the shooting of brutal Mr. Waters served as “a warning to married men who 
delight in beating their wives.”350 
C. Hard Cases 
1. Allegedly Nonconfrontational Killings or Disproportionate Violence 
Women who killed abusive intimate partners during a lull when they were not 
being attacked, or who seemed to respond disproportionately to a mild injury, 
proved more difficult to defend at trial. This difficulty arose from the firmly 
established requirements of self-defense—that the danger threatened must have 
been imminent and that the harm the defendant reasonably feared must have been 
that of death or great bodily injury.351 If, in the eyes of the trial judge, the evidence 
                                                                                                                 
defendant’s homicidal act, but the jury was allowed to consider reasonableness from “the 
position of the defendant, seeing what she saw at the time, and knowing what she knew at 
the time.” Id.; cf. People v. Smith, 214 P. 468, 473 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1923) (holding that 
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Killed Her Husband, supra note 340, at 3 (reporting the testimony of Carrie Anselmo). 
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aggressor in a fight). The manslaughter conviction of a young Indian woman in the 1920s 
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 349. See Mrs. Waters: The Second Day of Her Trial for Murder, supra note 340, at 2 
(recounting the testimony of Ben Benjamin and John Lang).  
 350. The Waters Case: Mrs. Waters Wants Her Husband Out of the Way, supra note 337. 
 351. See FAIRALL, supra note 228, at 281. The trial judge in Bridget Waters’s case 
instructed the jury: “Danger of death or great bodily harm must be imminent, present at the 
time, real or apparent and so urgent that there is no reasonable mode of escape except to take 
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did not show any hostile act by the deceased at the time of the killing, evidence of 
his past violence would be excluded or the jury would be instructed to disregard 
it.352 
The case of Mary Silk, who hacked her husband to death with an adze in 
Victoria in 1884,353 provides a poignant and disturbing example. Mrs. Silk raised 
claims of provocation and self-defense at trial,354 alleging that prior to the 
homicide, her husband Jacob had made an incestuous sexual assault upon the 
couple’s retarded fourteen-year-old daughter and that, during another incident, he 
had threatened to shoot the two women with a gun.355 Pursued by Mr. Silk, “[t]hey 
escaped to the house of one of the witnesses . . . and were concealed there.”356 The 
girl corroborated her mother’s story that the deceased again “took the gun and was 
going to shoot her” on the night of the homicide, but the jury apparently did not 
believe this.357 There was evidence of a fight between Jacob Silk and another man 
at a local pub that evening,358 so jurors may have thought Mr. Silk got the weapon 
to shoot his male foe, rather than to harm his wife and daughter. 
The killing of Jacob Silk was especially violent. On the night of the homicide, 
the accused gave the deceased a glass of gin and then sent their daughter to the 
public house to get some whiskey.359 After an absence of about twenty minutes, the 
daughter returned and saw her father lying on the floor face down in a pool of 
blood.360 The girl testified that her father was not yet dead when she returned from 
the pub but that the defendant subsequently hit him seven times with the adze.361 
Citing the especially “barbarous way in which the deceased was struck,” the judge 
opined that Mrs. Silk meant to make an example of her husband to deter their 
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 360. Id. 
 361. See Testimony of Mary Ann Silk (the younger), Trial Transcript in Queen v. Silk at 
2, supra note 353 (copy on file with author).  
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daughter from sexual misconduct.362 Under his construction of the facts, the 
women—rather than the allegedly incestuous and brutal man—were to blame for 
the shocking events. 
The jury convicted Mary Silk of Jacob’s murder because, under the laws of both 
self-defense and provocation, too much time had passed between the deceased’s 
threats and abuse of the women and his gruesome death.363 However, the jury 
construed the facts in a light more sympathetic to Mrs. Silk than the trial judge, 
who thought the incest claim “was not proved.”364 Despite returning a capital 
verdict, the jury recommended mercy for the prisoner “on account of her husband’s 
flagrant misconduct.”365 Mrs. Silk was sentenced to death, but the governor 
subsequently commuted her penalty to twenty years in prison.366 
Women in the American West who killed their partners in nonconfrontational 
situations or in response to assaults that judges and juries considered relatively 
trivial also faced significant obstacles to acquittal. Coll-Peter Thrush and Robert 
Keller, Jr. provide a splendid analysis of a Washington murder trial involving a 
woman of the S’Klallam tribe who shot her husband, George Phillips, in 1878 after 
he beat her with an oar and threatened to kill her.367 The defendant, Xwelas, 
claimed that she and Phillips struggled over the gun before it fired.368 However, 
other evidence cast doubt on this self-defense theory by suggesting that Xwelas 
became angry over her husband’s flirtation with another native woman and that she 
shot him stealthily from behind a screen of underbrush.369 Given the poor fit 
between the conflicting evidence and the law of self-defense, sympathetic relatives 
and neighbors seemed inclined to excuse Xwelas on insanity grounds.370 In the end, 
she was convicted of manslaughter, rather than murder, which Thrush and Keller 
describe as a lenient verdict, considering the formal law of self-defense.371 The 
authors offer a variety of explanations for this outcome, including the ill repute of 
her husband—an alcoholic, wife-beating Welsh laborer—and community-wide 
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sympathy for Xwelas, who was pregnant and already the mother of five children at 
the time of the homicide.372 
The early twentieth-century California case of Fay Alma Smith also highlights 
themes of violence, jealousy, and race and the difficulty of defending a woman 
whose case did not fit the paradigm constructed by self-defense law. Smith, a black 
woman, fatally shot her de facto husband, Arthur Bell, in 1922 after they got into a 
quarrel about his alleged attentions to other women.373 Smith claimed that Bell had 
a history of beating her and that on the night of the homicide, he struck her with a 
bottle, “grabbed her by the throat . . . and started to pick up a chair to strike her.”374 
Affirming the conviction for second-degree murder, however, the appellate court 
focused on Smith’s failure to exhibit any physical injuries at the time of the 
shooting and concluded that the evidence against her sustained the verdict.375 In the 
final analysis, the court adopted an unsympathetic view of Smith as a jealous 
woman who became enraged at her companion’s unfaithfulness. On appeal, she 
was held to have killed him without honestly believing “it was necessary to resort 
to such extreme means to defend herself against a threatened attack.”376 
I will argue below that the conviction of female defendants who claimed self-
defense was relatively rare in the American West for two reasons. First, as we have 
seen, women who killed their male partners during a moment of physical conflict 
could defend themselves as rational moral actors under traditional rules of 
evidence.377 Second, as I will explain shortly, the “unwritten law” justifying female 
defense of honor in the late 1800s and early 1900s extended to self-defensive 
killings that did not fit comfortably within the confines of the formal doctrine.378  
Why then was Fay Smith convicted of murder? Although courts sometimes 
treated women of color justly in self-defense cases,379 both convicted women 
discussed here—Smith and Xwelas—faced trials suffused with racial undertones. 
Smith’s failure to attract sympathy stemmed from a complicated array of factors 
that collectively cast her as a fallen woman. Not only was she black, she was also 
(according to the court’s impression) pugnacious and immoral. Furious over her 
lover’s inconstancy, she had allegedly approached her female rival and threatened 
to kill her, as well as Bell.380 Furthermore, because she was not Bell’s lawful, 
wedded wife, she acted “outside the protection of any right growing from a 
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marriage relation [when] she renewed the dangerous discussion [of her lover’s 
romantic dalliances] . . . , deliberately precipitat[ing] the quarrel” that resulted in 
his death.381 In short, as the appellate court depicted her, Smith was not a pure icon 
of femininity whose tragic resort to deadly force could be blamed on a man’s abuse 
of her. 
2. Alleged Murders for Gain 
A final category of “hard cases” that may have involved battered defendants 
were actually seen as easy cases at the time. In such cases, prosecutors charged 
women with murder under circumstances that indicated they desired to rid 
themselves of an inconvenient spouse for pecuniary gain or to pursue a sexual 
relationship with another man. The woman’s lover often perpetrated the killing, and 
the prosecutor charged the female defendant with murder on a complicity theory or 
with being an accessory to the crime. The typical verdict in Australia and the 
American West was the same: guilty.382 However, Australian women seem to have 
gotten harsher sentences than their counterparts on the western frontier of the 
United States. 
In Australia, the relatively rare cases prosecuted as “murders for gain” led to 
conviction almost without exception, even when there was some evidence that the 
deceased had inflicted violence upon the female prisoner. For example, Elizabeth 
Scott went to the gallows in Victoria in 1863, along with co-defendants Julian 
Cross and David Gedge, for the murder of her husband, Robert.383 When Robert 
turned up dead in his bed with a fatal bullet wound, Elizabeth was accused of 
having an illicit relationship with her lodger, Gedge.384 Gedge accused Cross, a 
mixed-race cook who worked for the Scotts, and Cross confessed to the murder but 
also implicated the other two.385 Elizabeth claimed to have been away from the 
house when the fatal shot was fired.386 
Elizabeth’s testimony revealed a history of distrust and violence in her marriage. 
She claimed the deceased was a jealous drunk.387 However, although she also 
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deposed that he sometimes assaulted her and recently threatened her life, she did 
not seem to view these incidents as particularly serious:  
My husband when in liquor was quiet but he used to blow me up now 
and then but nothing to signify . . . during his late illness he has 
threatened to take my life but I never took any notice of it. There was 
always a pistol lying on the shelf within his reach, he was always drunk 
when he threatened to take my life and when he was sober he was 
always sorry for it.388 
If these allegations were true,389 she made a tragic error in failing to emphasize 
her past history of domestic abuse. Calling greater attention to it might have saved 
her from hanging, as it did Mary Silk. Instead, the narrative that prevailed at 
Elizabeth’s trial and in the newspapers was that of a pretty adulteress with a vulgar 
sense of humor and a liking for drink, who “exhibited the utmost levity and 
apparent indifference to the death of her husband and to her own position [as a 
capital defendant].”390 The police report stated: “She only appeared to be depressed 
in spirits but once, and that was on the morning that the prisoner Gedge left for 
Beechworth Gaol. She watched his departure and then had a long and hearty 
cry.”391 
The prosecution’s successful depiction of the Scott murder as a means to 
facilitate an illicit sexual bond became the dominant script in other cases resulting 
in the execution or life-sentencing of Australian women. Subsequent versions of 
this narrative included the trial of Annie O’Brien, convicted of poisoning her de 
facto husband so she could run off with another man,392 and Selina Sangal, a 
pregnant woman initially sentenced to hang for conspiring with a lover to kill her 
husband, Edward.393 Both O’Brien and Sangal received life terms with hard labor 
after their death sentences were commuted.394 Their cases had harsher outcomes 
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than those for women whose homicidal acts were deemed to have arisen from 
drunkenness or from the misconduct of their abusive husbands.395 In the American 
West, the murder-for-gain theory also won guilty verdicts for the prosecution, but 
the charging and sentencing decisions in such cases tended to be more lenient than 
in Australia.396  
D. The “Unwritten Law” for Women in the American West 
In the United States, cultural understandings of women’s right to defend 
themselves against dishonor and mistreatment had two effects that gave abuse 
victims a greater likelihood of acquittal than in Australia. First, sympathy for 
wronged women charged with murder extended beyond cases in which the 
defendant suffered physical injury at the hands of her partner to scenarios involving 
seduction, abandonment, and emotional cruelty.397 Second, in cases of physical 
abuse, courts and especially juries looked at a wider time frame around the killing 
and considered past abuse in assessing self-defense claims. The “unwritten law” 
thus became a safety net for women whose cases poorly fit the narrow parameters 
of the formal self-defense doctrine.398 
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Victimization 5 (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with author). 
 398. See infra Part II.D.2. 
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1. Honor Killings by Women  
Women whose honor had been sullied by men who jilted them, committed 
adultery, or caused myriad types of degradation routinely obtained acquittals.399 
Indeed, westerners joined other parts of the nation in recognizing an unwritten law 
that favored virtuous female defendants.400 This unwritten law justified homicides 
perpetrated by a variety of wronged women, not exclusively those who had been 
physically abused. The Los Angeles Times stated in 1886: “The unwritten law in 
every American community which holds a woman guiltless who in the desperation 
of her sorrow, or in the face of a dishonored life, sheds the blood of her betrayer, is 
not dormant here.”401 By contrast, I have not uncovered any honor-killing cases that 
led to acquittal in Australia.402  
The unwritten law for women derived from a related theory of justification 
available to men.403 The men’s version, which exonerated defendants who killed 
their wives’ lovers, particularly in the American South and West,404 was already 
being challenged in judicial rulings by the late nineteenth century. For example, 
when Joe Hurtado slew his wife’s seducer in California in 1882, the judge refused 
to allow the defendant to introduce evidence of adultery to support his argument for 
acquittal.405 According to the Hurtado trial court: 
Our law does not make seduction an excuse for killing. Even if a man 
caught another in an adulterous act with his wife, it does not make it an 
excuse, and if he kills under the impulse of dishonor and in his rage, it 
reduces the crime only to manslaughter.406 
                                                                                                                 
 
 399. See Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 30, at 118–25 (discussing the acquittal 
of “wronged” women whom juries deemed justified in killing “bad” men). 
 400. Two Women: On Trial for Their Lives for Murder in California, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
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 405. See Adultery No Excuse for Murder, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1882, at 1. 
 406. Id. (paraphrasing the court’s reasoning). The trial court apparently did allow the 
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However, while the unwritten law for men was in decline in some parts of the 
West,407 it persisted into the twentieth century as a means of justifying homicides 
that women perpetrated. 
Classic honor killings by women involved pregnant wives or girlfriends whom 
the decedent left in the lurch. For instance, in 1915, a San Diego jury deliberated 
for less than half an hour before it acquitted Ruth Jaquith of murdering her spouse 
Walter. The accused was “in a delicate condition, [when she] shot her husband after 
he . . . declared he would leave her.”408 The evidence showed not only that Walter 
had threatened to end their relationship, but also that he was a bigamist when they 
married.409 Ruth claimed the fatal incident was an accident; according to her 
account, she merely intended frighten her husband. 410  Yet the cheering crowds of 
women who greeted her acquittal suggest that the verdict was viewed as a more 
fundamental triumph for feminine honor.411 Unmarried women were also 
exonerated for avenging unfulfilled promises of marriage from men who had gotten 
them pregnant.412  
Abandonment was not the only type of dishonor women might justifiably 
avenge. For instance, a prosecutor dismissed a murder case against Josephine 
Higgins in 1887, saying “he had no hope of convicting her” after a hung jury in her 
first trial.413 Although Josephine described her husband’s death in an opium den as 
a suicide,414 at least one witness claimed she had earlier confessed to stabbing him 
in a moment of homicidal jealousy.415 Even under the latter version of the facts, 
some observers deemed the killing justifiable because the deceased had forced 
                                                                                                                 
defendant’s wife to testify that she told him she was unfaithful, but it excluded evidence that 
might have shown the existence of an adulterous relationship between the wife and the 
deceased. See People v. Hurtado, 63 Cal. 288, 290–91 (1883). The court also declined to 
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not of itself tend to reduce the crime to murder of the second degree” because it would not 
negate premeditation. Id. at 296. Moreover, even if an oral report of adultery made the 
defendant unreasonably angry, the crime could not be reduced to manslaughter, which 
required provocation sufficient to arouse passion in a reasonable person. Id. at 292. 
 407. But cf. PETTEGREW, supra note 3, at 304 (noting that Texas did not repeal its 
paramour statute until 1973). 
 408. Women Cheer Jury Verdict, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1915, at II7; see Verdict Form 
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author); Criminal Information (filed Jan. 14, 1915), People v. Jaquith, supra (copy on file 
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 409. See Women Cheer Jury Verdict, supra note 408.  
 410. See id. 
 411. See id. 
 412. See, e.g., Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 30, at 118–21 (discussing the case 
of Pasqualina Robertiello in late nineteenth-century New York). 
 413. An Alleged Murderess Told to Go and Lead a Proper Life, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 
1887, at 4. 
 414. See Another Mysterious Murder, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1886, at 1. 
 415. See Murder or Suicide, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1886, at 1. 
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Josephine into prostitution. According to the Los Angeles Times, the defendant was 
innocent under the unwritten law authorizing a woman to defend her honor.416  
2. Killings Justified by Past Physical Abuse 
A second application of the unwritten law supported self-defense claims by 
female defendants who did not clearly face an immediate threat of death or 
grievous bodily injury. As we have seen, such women were the hardest to defend in 
both the American West and Australia.417 But the stronger culture of protectiveness 
toward women in the United States gave those who had killed abusive husbands or 
lovers an additional argument for exoneration. In 1910, for example, Mae Talbot 
faced a murder charge arising from the shooting of her gambler husband in Reno, 
Nevada.418 Mae took the witness stand in her own defense and recounted a history 
of violence at the deceased’s hands: 
 According to Mrs. Talbot her husband treated her in a brutal manner, 
often threatening to kill her and beating her horribly at times. On the 
night before the shooting, Mrs. Talbot stated that her husband gave her 
a fearful beating, kicking her and pulling her from her bed by the hair. 
Her condition was such as to necessitate the services of a physician.419 
On the day of the fatal shooting, she and her husband met at an attorney’s office 
to discuss their divorce settlement.420 During this meeting, “an altercation ensued 
and Talbot struck her.”421 Mae then fatally shot him with a pistol that she carried in 
her muff.422 In short, there was a confrontation in this case, but not one likely to be 
deemed life threatening unless the cumulative abuse of Mae Talbot was taken into 
account.  
The formal doctrine of self-defense required that the defendant’s lethal act be 
proportional to the harm she faced;423 a simple assault did not justify homicide.424 
Following this clearly established law, the trial judge in the Talbot case gave 
                                                                                                                 
 
 416. See Two Women: On Trial for Their Lives for Murder in California, supra note 400, 
at 10. 
 417. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 418.  See Didn’t Know She Shot, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1910, at I5. 
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instructions requiring the defendant to have had a reasonable belief that “the danger 
was so urgent and pressing” as to make killing the assailant “absolutely necessary” 
to save her own life or prevent great bodily harm.425 Yet he also reminded the jury 
that “under the laws of the State of Nevada a husband has no right to physically 
chastise his wife,” and he indicated that the gender of the defendant and the 
deceased could be taken into account.426 “After a short deliberation[,] the jury 
returned a verdict of not guilty” in Mae’s case, thus suggesting it considered the 
past violence of the deceased relevant and exonerating.427  
A decade later in San Diego County, California, Ruby Conley was acquitted of 
murder for fatally shooting her husband while he was restrained by a deputy sheriff 
who had responded to her wife-beating call.428 Female defendants were thus found 
not guilty despite a lack of evidence of imminent danger, as the formal doctrine 
defined it, because the unwritten law allowed juries to place a self-defensive 
homicide in the context of a relationship in which the decedent had degraded, 
tormented, and often nearly killed the accused. Moreover, cultural norms played a 
role in shaping the law from the bench. Some judges, including the one who 
presided over Mae Talbot’s trial, even directed juries to consider gender and 
marital roles when hearing a self-defense claim. 
Defense attorneys also invoked the unwritten law to bolster the justification of 
clients whose homicidal acts fit formal self-defense law better than Mae Talbot or 
Ruby Conley’s did. For instance, a California lawyer contended that the fatal 
shooting of George Bross in 1923 “was justifiable on account of the extreme 
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cruelty . . . shown by the husband against his wife.”429 Here, he referred to more 
than two-and-a-half years of beatings and other violence, including an incident in 
which George threw his wife over a forty-foot cliff.430 Lillian shot George months 
later when he started choking her in an automobile.431 However, under the 
prevailing norms in California at the time, she need not have cited an immediate 
attack to obtain exoneration.432 Unless a female defendant had engaged in 
misconduct that made her irretrievably immoral in the jury’s eyes,433 the deceased 
man’s cumulative acts of domestic terror sufficed for acquittal, or at the least 
manslaughter mitigation, in western American states during the period covered by 
this Article. 
CONCLUSION 
Many scholars contend that the government has systematically trivialized or 
ignored intimate-partner violence perpetrated by males.434 Yet my research 
suggests that there is another side to the story—the sustained (but largely 
ineffectual) effort to police and civilize men by punishing violence against women. 
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, husbands were routinely arrested or 
summoned to court for beating their wives. But the dilemma of how to change the 
behavior of recidivist batterers whose frightened, socioeconomically dependent 
victims were reluctant to use the criminal courts contributed to an acknowledged 
failure of prevention. Thus, when women killed their abusive partners, their actions 
were often deemed wholly or partially justified. In contrast, juries usually convicted 
men of spousal murder. Such trends did not uniquely characterize frontier societies; 
indeed, they were borrowed from long-settled parts of the United States and 
England where ideals of respectable male behavior were more firmly entrenched.435  
The chief difference between domestic violence cases in Australia and the 
American West was that, in Australia, men’s greater empathy with other men and 
discomfort with female encroachment on their prerogatives softened punishments 
for the battering and killing of women. It also made the conviction of female 
defendants somewhat more likely in Australia than in the United States. However, 
analysis of intimate-partner assaults and homicides in both regions demonstrates 
that it was not the stereotypically glorified masculine violence of the frontier, but 
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the struggle for civilized statehood (or in the Australian context, civilized 
nationhood) that played the biggest role in the outcome of these cases.  
This Article has shown that the home was less private in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries than most scholars assume. Even in frontier societies that 
displayed a high level of violence against women, police and courts tried to prevent 
the abuse of wives by imposing peace bonds, fines, and even prison time on their 
husbands. When domestic violence escalated to homicide, men faced murder 
convictions, while a woman’s self-defensive killing of her abusive husband was 
often deemed justified because it was understood that a wife could not easily leave 
her marriage or rely on the courts to protect her. Whether a man who beat his wife 
was a criminal defendant or a homicide victim, he engaged in behavior that society 
and the state denounced as barbaric and unrespectable in the late 1800s and early 
1900s.  
Modern domestic violence policy is premised on the belief that, prior to the 
battered women’s movement of the late twentieth century, Anglo-American 
societies experienced a long history of tolerance toward intimate-partner abuse. 
Hence, scholars and reformers today tend to see victim resistance to the aggressive 
policing and prosecution of batterers as a new dilemma. My historical research 
indicates, by contrast, that neither concern about intimate-partner violence, nor 
sensitivity to abused women’s reluctance to prosecute, nor sympathy with their 
self-defensive use of deadly force, began with second-wave feminism. To be sure, 
the efforts of police, prosecutors, and criminal courts in the late 1800s and early 
1900s to enforce the values of civilized manliness lacked the strong commitment to 
gender equality characteristic of modern reform campaigns. Nevertheless, at the 
end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, there was greater 
concern about intimate-partner violence, and corresponding state intervention in the 
family to punish such violence, than many scholars realize.  
  
